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All too often when the issue of NATO enlargement is raised some of the current
members object to it due to one of several preconceptions. The more common objections
include the potential members' perceived domestic and economic problems, the various
disputes between these countries themselves, and the adverse position Russia has taken
regarding the question.
The author intends to show that present requirements, as set forth in the September
1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement," were not applied to previous enlargements, a fact
that raises the question of fairness in present members' expectations. Furthermore, by
examining three alternative scenarios for Russia in the future, it will be shown that none of
these suggests that the issue of enlargement should be dropped. Finally, the study of
Hungary, a country representing a "middle ground" among the so-called "Visegrad four,"
will demonstrate that Hungary is closer today to complying with the strict expectations set
forth in the document than previously added members were, although their task was much
less demanding. This implies that stereotypes are involved in resistance to NATO
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The thesis, "On the Perceived Obstacles to NATO Enlargement" examines three
commonly held notions in the current NATO enlargement debate. First is the opinion that
previous enlargements were extended to countries that were somehow more "worthy" and
closer to the "West" than are today's applicants. As Chapter II shows, this was not exactly
the case. What is more, if they had had to comply with the requirements set forth in the
September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargements", the previous applicants would not have
been awarded membership. The Alliance, therefore, risks setting a double standard that,
from the outside, might seem devised to keep enlargement at bay rather than aid applicants
in their endeavors.
The second notion is that connected to Russia. Various experts judge the future of
the Russian Federation differently, but many say that NATO enlargement would be
detrimental to European security because of Russia's reaction to it. The thesis examines
three scenarios (those of "imperial Russia", weak/"Weimar-type" Russia, democratic
future) and comes to the conclusion that NATO enlargement should go forward in any
case. Russia could be compensated, but not with being awarded a say in the Alliance's
affairs.
Finally, the third such belief is examined in Chapter IV. The chapter questions the
notion that none of the current applicants are ready for membership yet. Through the
IX
example of Hungary, it shows the level of compliance with NATO's requirements that has
already been achieved, a level significantly higher than many might suspect. It also asks
if some of the requirements might be contradictory (e.g., the need to establish a market
economy surely clashes with the arguments for force modernization, interoperability, and
standardization, which would require significant investments in the military rather than
the civilian sphere).
Chapter V examines the options available to NATO. It seems that the Alliance's new
mission needs new "markets" — markets that will not be found inside NATO. Perhaps the
fact that the Alliance's new "product" is to be regional security and stability, and the
promotion of democratic values, should suggest that new partners be taken on with whom
to co-operate in production.
I. INTRODUCTION
oday, in the West, an abundance of publications discusses the merits and
fx| .|_^^i possible methods of NATO enlargement vis-a-vis Central and Eastern
Europe. While many of the proposals are nothing but the guesswork of imaginative
scholars and experts, the arguments can be separated into three basic categories. One camp
declares that NATO enlargement is not feasible either because the Alliance would lose its
identity and credibility if former Warsaw Pact members were allowed to join it and/or
because it would antagonize Russia and be harmful to democracy there. The second
approach tentatively suggests that while in theory membership would be desirable, present
obstacles (for example, economic problems in East and West alike, the lack of properly
working democracies in the East, the political inclinations of the U.S. Congress, Western
public opinion, etc.) are such that it cannot be achieved, at least not in the short term. A
third group claims that enlargement is the way to ensure that the ongoing difficult
transformation of the Alliance is successful - and the sooner the better. (Some in this group
even see NATO enlargement as a way to enhance democracy in Russia.) This approach
also includes the opinion that this may be NATO's last chance to survive its victory in the
Cold War. All three camps have one thing in common: the analysis of each does not allow
for future situations envisioned by the others.
There are fundamental problems with the current debate. First of all, the discussion
is still based mainly on Cold War rhetoric, even though NATO's new strategic doctrine has
been in existence for five years. Much of the relevant analysis tends to ascribe the
attributes ofthe Soviet Union to Russia. This may signal one of two things: either present
Russian attitudes resemble those ofthe past (be they those of the USSR or Imperial Russia)
too closely, or Sovietologists (and the Alliance) are simply unable to adjust to the changes
that have happened during the past decade. If the former reasoning is accepted, it is hard
to see what obvious advantages there would be in again leaving East Europe in the Russian
sphere of influence, as many of those against enlargement suggest. The tactics of
appeasement that these people seem to advise failed to work in the past, so why believe
it would be effective today? Furthermore, precedents ofNATO enlargement demonstrate
that, at least in the case ofthe "Visegrad four" (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia), the obstacles to membership are hardly as serious as were those in some of the
previous cases.
If, on the other hand, one accepts the reasoning that the post-Cold War situation is
fundamentally different from what it was earlier, it is again difficult to see how this would
validate the reasoning against enlargement. If the threat is instability (as many during the
search for a new NATO doctrine implied), it may be in the best interest ofNATO to allow
new members into the Alliance, thus aiding the creation of a stable regional environment.
In this respect, Russian objections, while they should be taken seriously, should not be
given priority over other relevant considerations regarding the possible advantages of
enlargement.
Either way, the arguments for and against widening NATO are less than satisfactory.
Meanwhile, a fundamental piece of the puzzle in the debate goes largely undetected. It
could be described as the "real", versus the "perceived," membership potential of the
applicants. Economic, political, and social indicators that describe these countries'
readiness for the Alliance are often subject to prejudiced interpretations.
Although economic models of alliance behavior abound, few experts have dealt with
the problems of enlargement in economic terms. This, particularly after decades of acute
burden-sharing disputes, is very surprising. The 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement",
while it remains fairly vague on the concrete expectations, at least tries to remedy some
of these problems. Its four sets of requirements describe the minimum needed for
membership. Among them, it is suggested, the economy is the area where the arguments
against enlargement could be most persuasive. The thesis will examine this notion through
a study of potential Hungarian membership.
There are particular merits to this approach. If the Cold War-like scenario is
accepted, then the economic counter-motivations experts sometimes cite could hardly
come into play when the containment of an imperial Russia is at stake. If, on the other
hand, there is a new agenda, a new international environment, then the Cold War-type
reasoning should be entirely abandoned, and a new paradigm found. In this case, the
importance ofeconomic factors has yet to be qualified. There is only one instance in which
enlargement to include Central (and/or East) European countries could be dismissed: if the
post-Cold War scenario is accepted, and the economic factors indicate that the costs
associated with expansion will outweigh the potential benefits. Nevertheless, to decide
whether to enlarge or not would require at least a serious examination of such questions,
which has not been the case.
Chapter II of the thesis will deal with the question of whether the discussions that
accompanied past occasions of enlargement have something relevant to contribute to the
current debates. Did today's often-stressed concerns such as "These countries should
become stable democracies first," or "We do not want to alienate Russia" have anything
to do with past decisions about which countries became members of the Alliance? It is of
particular importance to examine the circumstances leading to the formal acceptance of
Greece and Turkey (1952), the Federal Republic ofGermany (1955), and Spain (1982) into
NATO. One must determine what these four countries had to offer NATO that made their
membership not only possible but also desirable. It is just as important to have a look at
the extent to which these promises were fulfilled. Based on the individual characteristics
of these processes, further research can then establish a set of variables to be applied to the
present situation. It is not assumed that the cases of these four "late arrivals" will reveal
the full spectrum of favorable motivations leading to membership. The presence of these
motivations, or the lack thereof, however, is an indicator of where the current process may
lead. In fact, the absence of the motivations of the past may indicate a need to re-examine
present circumstances and adjust NATO decision-making accordingly.
Chapter III will detail various possible scenarios regarding the future of Russia —
since the question whether to wait (indeed, ask) for Russian approval ofNATO expansion
seems to be one of the most divisive issues among those who accept the need for the
widening of the Alliance. Does Russia behave as would an imperial power? Or, to the
contrary, does it threaten European (and perhaps global) security by its very fragility? Is
there a case to be made for the possible emergence of a democratic Russia? In general, the
issue is whether Russian disapproval of NATO expansion should be given key
consideration.
Once these arguments against enlargement have been examined, Chapter IV will
present an examination of the situation based on the requirements set forth in the
September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement". It will also examine the economic
argument, a hitherto minor issue in the debate. Using Hungarian economic and, to some
extent, military statistics, an interpretation of the Hungarian burden-sharing potential in
relation to that of current NATO-members will be considered. From this exercise it is
hoped that some general conclusions can be drawn regarding the importance of economic
factors in the eastward enlargement of the Alliance.
Finally, Chapter V will serve to summarize the results of the inquiry, and also to
point up some of the expectations regarding NATO's future.

II. NATO ENLARGEMENT - THE RELEVANCE OF PAST
EXPERIENCES
Enlarging NATO launches us all on a voyage of discovery.
Not only will it change NATO, it will also deeply change
the environment in which NATO operates.
- Hans Jochen Peters 1
any times during the years since the end of the Cold War the question of whatM
to do with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has arisen. During the course
of the sometimes fervent debates a number of potential solutions were discussed. These
suggestions range from closing down business altogether to turning NATO from a
collective defense organization into one of collective security. While ample supporters of
both proposals exist, it is the alternatives between the two extremes that have been given
the most thorough appreciation, and that seem most viable.
Between the two extreme options lies the basic choice of preserving NATO with its
current membership, but changing its mission, and that of enlargement to include new
members. The latter would also necessarily imply some alterations in the Alliance's
mission. The debate that set the stage for these two basic choices was prompted by the
Allies' declaration at their November 1991 Rome Summit. It said:
Hans Jochen Peters, "The Political Dimension", in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargement.
Opinions and Options (National Defense University, Fort McNair: Washington, DC, 1995),
167.
[T]he developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact
on the way in which [NATO's] aims would be met in the future. [...] In contrast
with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain
are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to
predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if
stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. 2
Issued half a year after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and prior
to the breakup of the Soviet Union, this communique did not address the question of
whether the changes in the responsibilities should be followed by changes in the
organization's membership. Its main aim was to acknowledge the need to preserve the
Alliance. A series of subsequent documents have established a security partnership between
the former Warsaw Pact members and NATO. Only lately has enlargement become a
central issue. The question itself arguably surfaced first in the 1990 London Declaration,
which stated:
We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably
linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution
where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the
common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. 3
Since then, there has been a vast amount of speculation about whether NATO will
eventually accept some or most of the former Warsaw Pact members into its ranks, the
"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" (NATO Press Communique S-l (91)85: Brussels, 7th
November 1991), 1,3.
U.S. Department of State, NATO Transformed: The London Declaration (Bureau of Public
Affairs: Washington, DC, 1990), 2.
aspirants often including the Russian Federation. Once it became clear that NATO,
although wary of alienating a potentially strong Russia, rejected the idea of accepting it as
a member (lest it overwhelm NATO due to its sheer size), the question has been reduced
to whether any of the East European states could aspire to membership, and if yes, whether
Russia would allow them to participate in an Alliance other than one including Russia.
Many Central and East European states see NATO membership as the only way to
preserve their sovereignty. As the single viable collective defense organization in Europe
today, and as the winner of the Cold War, NATO is a tempting umbrella for the insecure
new constellation of states in East Europe. Most ofthem fear the return of an aggressive
Russia, ready to reestablish itself as the greatest power in Europe. Other motivations
include the (quite natural) belief that membership in European institutions (e.g., the
European Union and NATO) is somehow interconnected, and to achieve one means to
achieve the other also. 4 Another reason to join NATO is to provide an enhanced level of
security within the turbulent atmosphere of East European politics.
By 1995, members of the Alliance seemed to agree on one thing: membership should
be extended only to those states that comply with a set of criteria established by current
NATO members. After a lengthy debate, the following four conditions were stipulated as
necessary for membership:
As explained by Zbigniew Brzezinski's article, "A Plan for Europe", Foreign Affairs 74, no.l
(January/February 1995), 26-42.
72. Prospective members will have to have:
- Demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles,
including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes
including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, as referred to also in paragraph 6 of Chapter 1;
- Shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic
liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility;
- Established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defence force;
- Undertaken a commitment to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to
achieving the obligations described in section A and C. 5
It is reasonable to ask whether past precedents of enlargements (Greece and Turkey
in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982) could give some
guidance about the pertinence of these criteria as conditions for NATO acceptance. It is
often argued that they do not, and that no appropriate comparisons can be drawn. On the
other hand, much of the debate still uses arguments that were used in the earlier cases,
albeit with a definite twist: the same arguments that seemed to support enlargement in the
past are now used to preclude an eastward widening of NATO. What is more, current
reasoning against enlargement could just as well have been used in the past, except for the
fact that then NATO was evidently prepared to waive such strict requirements.
It is therefore reasonable to examine past experiences of enlargement to see whether
Cold War thinking might still guide the decisionmaking process inside the Alliance, or
whether the situation today is so different from that of the Cold War that the Alliance's
circumspection is in fact warranted. It is very important to test ideas on enlargement
5
"Study on NATO Enlargement" (NATO-OTAN: Brussels, September 1995), 25.
10
against the same reasoning statesmen and experts used previously. This will give the
perspective necessary for a more objective exploration of the issues at stake.
A. THE THRUST TOWARD THE MEDITERRANEAN
The security of the center is directly tied to that of the
southern flank. The southern flank provides a frontline of
defense. [...] as one of only two NATO states bordering the
Soviet Union, Turkey — depending on the axis of the
Soviet attack — could act to shield the center from Soviet
pressure. In addition, any campaign by the Soviets to
destabilize central Europe is likely to be initiated on the
flank...
- Jed C. Snyder6
When in 1948 the signatories to the Brussels Treaty decided to invite the United
States to take part in their association, little did they know that in the wake of the Korean
War they would end up with a lasting American presence in Europe, much less that they
were on the verge of the first enlargements of the Alliance. In the course of debates on
NATO's operating concepts, activities, and central tasks, the strategic significance of
NATO's southern flank — to which three of the four states examined here belong — were
often downplayed. It was largely due to the overwhelming American influence in NATO
that enlargements happened during the first four decades of the existence of the Alliance.
Contrary to common belief, the Mediterranean area from the beginning of the East-
West confrontation was considered of utmost importance — partly because of its
Jed C. Snyder, Defending the Fringe. NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf
(Westview: Boulder, Colo., 1985), 3.
11
geographical position (closeness to the Soviet Union, control over many of the sea routes
in the Mediterranean, access to the Persian Gulf), and partly because of the zero-sum
nature of the bloc-building contest, whereby alliance with a new state was seen as
disadvantageous to the other side. Thus, the idea to expand NATO to include Turkey and
Greece was born.
1. Turkey and Greece: Parallel "Enrollment", Similar Problems
Soon after the end of World War II, Turkish-American security cooperation began.
In the wake of the Soviet threat the United States took a series of measures to safeguard
Turkey and Greece. Large-scale cooperation between the United States and Turkey started
in 1947 with the extension of American aid. The United States early on recognized the
importance ofthe geographical position of Turkey, especially its controlling position over
the Bosporus Straits (as described by the Montreux Convention of 19367 ). The latter
provided a warm-water sea exit for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Early in World War II, in
1940, Soviet claims to alter the deliberations in the Montreux Convention so as to allow
joint defense of the area had resulted in a rift between the Soviets and Nazi Germany.
Later, at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences, the USSR pursued the same





In the face of the growing tensions between East and West, the Soviet efforts met
with general disapproval. Yet at the time of the conclusion of the Washington Treaty in
April 1949, which set the stage for NATO's formation, both Turkey and Greece were
excluded. The argument against Turkish and Greek membership was that it "would
increase the danger of war, would add to the rearmament burden, and would spread NATO
too thin."
8
Turkish officials had been wary of Soviet intentions, all the more so because of
the long history of hostility between the two states. In an essay on Turkey's place and role
in NATO, A. Karaosmanoglu states:
It is only natural that this violent history, punctuated by thirteen wars between
the Russian and Ottoman Empires, created an atmosphere of traditional enmity
between the two nations. In the mind of the average Turk, Russia is a
hereditary enemy. 9
In the light of this historical clash of interests it is perhaps not surprising that the
Turks chose to align themselves with the West rather than the Soviet-led East. A 1952
reference to the decisions leading to Turkish membership describes the process as a parallel
understanding of the benefits of such an alliance:
[T]he West [...] have been brought to the position which the Turks had reached
in the course of almost 300 years of intermittent conflict with Russia. During
this same period the Turkish people, freed from the rule of the Sultans and the
Ali Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts", in
John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (Routledge:
New York, 1988), 296.
Ibid., 290.
13
burdens of empire [...] have emerged as a nation state and entered the full
stream of Western progress... 10
While the above quotation might assign undue progress to the Turkey of the late
1 940s, it rightly points out that during this period the interests of the West and Turkey
coincided to such extent that it was possible to bring Turkey into NATO already in 1952,
three years earlier than West German membership was accepted. True enough, by the end
of World War II, many signs of the emergence of a proto-Western Turkey had become
evident, among them a substantial etatist economic growth in the wake of the Great
Depression. A widening educational system had helped develop the political sophistication
of the population. In short, Turkey had made at least reasonable progress toward Western-
style democracy.
From a Western perspective, Turkey's entry into the Alliance was precipitated by the
Korean War. While earlier debates about its possible membership centered around the
question of whether to give priority to the balance of power in Western Europe, by the
beginning of the war, many experts began to stress the overall importance of the Near East.
As one author put it,
10
George C. McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West", Foreign Affairs 32, no. 4 (July 1952), 61
14
Turkey's unique strategic position, enhanced by the changed face of postwar
geopolitical realities, gave it an important role to play in the defense of both
regions.
11
The reciprocity of the potential benefits was influential in bringing about the eventual
partnership. By the end of 1951, this requirement had been met: "Support for the balance
ofpower in the Near East interlocked with support for the balance of power in Europe." 12
Turkey, largely due to its history of conflict with Russia and its rejection of the Soviet
proposals to share the defense of the Straits, was seen as a reliable, anti-Communist state.
It, too, had been linked by a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France since 1939,
one that was reaffirmed in 1949. As Gordon Craig writes,
Whether the strategic importance of the Near East was as great to the Western
powers as it once had been was [...] at least debatable, although no NATO
commander would have admitted for a moment that bases in Turkey were an
insignificant contribution to Western defense or that a growth of Soviet
influence in the area would have negligible results. As for its economic value
to the West, there was no question whatsoever. 13
While it can be argued that the enlargement of the Alliance to include Turkey resulted
in a certain thinning of the allied defense, Turkey in many respects was able to
counterbalance this unfavorable situation. Turkish membership in NATO allowed the allies
Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and
Raimondo Luraghi, eds., NATO and the Mediterranean (Scholarly Resources, Inc.:




Gordon Craig, Europe since 1914 (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich: Orlando, Flor., 1989), 773.
15
to closely monitor traffic through the Straits, aiding Western intelligence gathering, and
denying the Soviets unobserved passage into the Mediterranean Sea. It also allowed the use
(or building) of military bases on Turkish territory, which brought Soviet vulnerabilities to
a NATO air attack closer to home. As a 1979 account reports,
At the present moment, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany possess
the largest NATO military forces in the European theater. [...] Turkey's
importance to Western security interests, however, cannot be measured solely
by the large numbers of Soviet and Soviet-bloc troops she might engage. A
crucial part of America's strategic (and tactical) defense effort relies upon
Turkish cooperation and Turkish base concessions... [T]hirty-one U.S., or joint
U.S. -Turkish bases have operated in Turkish territory for the purpose of
nuclear-weapons storage, detection of Soviet military activities, and
communications. 14
While not a high-tech military, Turkish defense forces were significant in number, and
Turkey's commitment to NATO — at least in the beginning — was clear. Furthermore,
Turkish membership in NATO materialized at a time, during the Korean War, when NATO
cohesion was low, and when many feared that the dissolution of the Alliance might be
imminent. 15
Greece's ascendance to membership started out along similar lines. Although it did
not directly border the Soviet Union, it had common borders with three other communist
14
Michael M. Boll, "Turkey's New National Security Concept: What it Means for NATO", Orbis
23, no. 3 (Fall 1979), 610.
15
Charles M. Spofford, "NATO's Growing Pains". Foreign Affairs 3 1 , no. 1 (Oct. 1952), 95-105.
16
states: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The first two had also had territorial claims at
the expense of Greece. Greece had also been the guardian of much of the Aegean Sea, and
an ally to the antifascist coalition during World War II. Greece has a history that doubtless
connects it with the "West", and which has, on occasion, invited the intervention of Western
powers in favor of this country, as in the formulation of the Yalta percentages. When, after
the end of the war, a bloody civil war erupted between the British-supported Greek
government and the leftist-led resistance movement, Britain pleaded with the United States
to support the Greek government in its stead. Stalin's break with his pledge given to
Churchill in 1944 — namely, that Greece would belong to the Western sphere of influence —
underscored the delicacy of the Greek situation. The result was the Truman Doctrine of
1947, which committed the USA "to come to the aid of Greece and Turkey against
Communist pressures." 16
The first steps toward the future partnership were followed by the disappointment of
the refusal, in 1950, of the original members ofNATO to allow Greece membership in the
Alliance. The Greeks believed that NATO membership was their only chance of national
security in their weakened state. It was at the time presumed that Greece, like Turkey,
belonged strategically more to the Middle East than to Western Europe.
The Greeks expected that membership would result in an enhanced national security,
thereby allowing them to pursue reconstruction after the ravages of almost a decade of
16
S. Victor Papacosma, "Greece and NATO", in Kaplan, Clawson, and Luraghi, eds., ibid., 191.
17
warfare. More than anything, the Greeks wanted political stability, because the polarization
of politics, ideology, and institutions during the Civil War of 1946-49 had left a lasting
heritage of imbalance. Controversy between pro-American ideals and pro-Soviet
inclinations was constant. Nevertheless, the Marshall Plan was extended to Greece and, as
Cold War tensions grew, the United States came to view Greece increasingly "as a bulwark
against communist expansion and its administrative, military economic and political
institutions were shaped to serve that purpose." 17
In the wake of the Korean War, much of the former opposition to enlargement was
abandoned, and approval for Greek membership was formally given at the 1951 Ottawa
session of NATO. The U.S. interest in the widening of the Alliance lay in the fact that by
widening NATO, it could better surround, and therefore contain, the USSR and its vassals.
An American military presence followed shortly after the Ottawa decision by way of a
bilateral base agreement in 1953, which "provided the United States with the right to
establish and supply its bases and the use of Greek airspace. It has also set out the legal
status of U.S. forces in Greece." 18
Ironically, the Greek-Turkish debate that would sour relations between the two
countries and with NATO was nowhere in sight during the period under discussion. On the
17
Thanos Veremis, "Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change", in Chipman, ed., ibid., 241
18
Ibid., 243.
contrary, everything seemed to be in order, the Greeks and the Turks each having professed
good relations toward the other. In fact,
In the postwar period, this reservoir of goodwill led to close cooperation
between the two countries under the benign umbrella of the Truman Doctrine.
Their sense of common destiny was also enhanced by the communist thrust in
Greece and by Soviet demands on Turkey. 19
While not quite so important strategically as Turkey, Greece had a number of factors
that facilitated its entry into NATO: it was a "Western" country in its cultural traditions; it
did not border on the USSR (therefore, direct objections to its membership could not be
made on this account); and it was originally "handed over" to the West during the Moscow
and Yalta negotiations of 1944. It was also a Christian country, and therefore, evoked moral
obligations in Western Europe as well as in the United States. All things considered, the
1952 enlargements were aptly described by Chester Wilmot, who in 1953 suggested:
Southern Europe is not perhaps of such direct importance for the protection of
the Allied forces in Central Europe, but it offers much greater opportunities for
compelling the Russians to disperse their forces defensively... [Greek and
Turkish forces] are neither so well trained nor so well equipped,but they are
very much closer to areas the Russians must defend. 20
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B. GERMANY: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE
Many of NATO's wounds stemmed from two very real
problems, both mtemal and both in many ways self-
inflicted. One was the inflammation of the German
question from 1952 to 1956...
- Lawrence S. Kaplan21
Next in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the Federal Republic of
Germany (1955). Its participation in the Alliance, however, was not accepted quite so easily
as was that ofTurkey and Greece. In the case of West Germany, opposition from the Soviet
Union was very strong. Its domination of the eastern part of Germany resulted in a period
of stalemate. The question of the postwar division of the country had three potential
outcomes, two of them favorable to the USSR. First, there could have been unification of
Germany under Soviet domination. Second, Germany could have been re-unified under the
pretext of neutralization (which could only be seen as merely a preparatory phase to Soviet
takeover). And third, the outcome could be the one that ultimately happened, i.e. division.
Throughout much of the post-World War II period prior to West German membership in
NATO, Soviet proposals and actions were aimed at achieving either of the first two options.
Soviet antagonism aside, objections came from within the Alliance. Nazi Germany's
victims viewed postwar Germany as genetically related to its predecessor, prone to repeat
the war-making mistakes of the past. Loudest among the protestors was France.
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A further difficulty was that the Germans themselves were divided on the issue of
membership. On the one hand, they had difficulty accepting the division of their country,
and knew that should they decide to join NATO, the issue would remain unresolved ~ at
least for the time being. To many, the Soviet offers of neutralization seemed preferable to
this solution. On the other hand, Germany had to redeem itself in the eyes not only of
Europe, but ofhuman civilization, too. 22 To rebuild after the war it needed the loans and aid
the United States alone could then provide, and to guard itself against the Soviet Union,
Germany needed Western cooperation. As World War I, World War II had left Germany
an economic wasteland. This time, however, due largely to the United States' s positive
influence and the emergence of the Atlantic cooperation, Germany did not stand alone.
The creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 was prompted by the failure
of the Western occupying powers to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. 23 In Craig's
words, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
did not concentrate his energies on the pursuit of national unity and the
liberation of seventeen million Germans in the Soviet zone, for these things
seemed remote and impossible [...] Instead, he bent his efforts to reducing the
restrictions still imposed on West Germany by the Allies. 24
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His shrewd politics served to secure Bundestag assent for entrance into NATO, a final
step in the Federal Republic's reacceptance into the West. Western cooperation during the
first Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 was influential in bringing NATO into existence. Six years
later, after a number of Soviet proposals to unite Germany on Soviet terms or, as a last
concession, under the slogan of neutralization, 25 Germany decided to join NATO and
abandon the dream of early unification. However, at the time ofjoining the Alliance, the
answer to the question, "Is Germany part of the West'?" was still being pondered by many
Germans. 26
In 1955, several months before German membership in NATO had materialized,
Adenauer summed up his tasks in the following three directives: (1) Germany must become
an equal partner in the community of free nations; (2) the failure of the European Defense
Community has left a vacuum in its wake that must be filled; 27 (3) the Brussels Pact of 1948
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(the basis of the Western European Union) must be harmonized with NATO, and its anti-
German character must be dropped. 28
For the West, it was essential to bring West Germany under the umbrella of collective
defense and into the community of Western democracies. Germany's admittance into the
Alliance was preceded by a period when, due to the increased Soviet threat, there were
serious doubts about the West's ability to defend itself. The United States wanted to see its
European allies more attuned to the idea of self-help. When the plans to create a European
Defense Community were torpedoed in the French Assembly, alternative arrangements had
to be made to allow for West German participation in the defense of the West. Without the
Federal Republic of Germany, NATO had lacked strategic depth in the central front, a fact
that was widely seen with apprehension during the early years ofNATO's existence. In the
case of a Soviet attack, the Allies thought, there would be nowhere to draw back to, and
Allied strength would easily be split by invading Soviet bloc forces. As Chester Wilmot
concluded in 1953,
The European campaigns of 1940-45 provide two significant lessons in this
respect. First, a powerful enemy breakthrough on the Rhine cannot be checked
short of the Channel ifthere is no strong mobile force in reserve. [...] Secondly,
in dealing with the Soviet preponderance in numbers, the defenders must be
free to yield ground in order both to cushion the assault and to canalize the
thrusts so that they become vulnerable to counterattack. [...] It is this need for
28
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strategic depth which makes it so important that Western Germany should be
incorporated into the defense structure of Western Europe. 29
A Soviet-united or neutralized Germany would have made this picture even bleaker.
In that case, NATO members supposed, the combined German military potential would
soon be used to break the resistance of the West and establish some sort of a Soviet
"protectorate" over the rest of Europe, too. 30 Strategically, it would have been possible for
the Soviets to withdraw from the Elbe to the Oder, but West Europe would have been at risk
if it had been forced to withdraw behind the Rhine, as proposals for the neutralization of
Germany suggested.
A significant, and at the time very divisive, issue in allowing Germany to join the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the need to accommodate and pacify a still
potentially dangerous Germany in Europe. 31 In fact,
America's conversion to the EDC was a function both of a desire to get
Germany rearmed and of a continuing determination to keep it under firm
control until the Germans could prove their "worthiness" for full and
unrestricted membership in the community of nations. 32
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Many people in Europe saw the division of Germany as the ultimate solution to the
eternal "German Question". This notion was grounded in the reasoning that by keeping the
two Germanies from uniting, their ambitions would be reduced to achieving unification, in
sharp contrast with their previous dreams.
After a period of Soviet probing into the firmness of the Alliance, even Khrushchev
had to accept the unchangeable. In an early "admission of defeat" in 1955, the German
Democratic Republic was recognized by the USSR as a sovereign state, "... and thereafter
the Moscow leaders took the line that German reunification could come about only as a
result of negotiations between the two German governments."33
C. SPAIN: THE LATEST OR THE LAST?
Spanish entry into NATO was largely the result of
domestic political considerations. It was hoped that
Alliance membership would help to control and
professionalize the miltary. [...] Great efforts have
been made to force the military to look towards
external threats and away from its traditional
introspective role.
- Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse34
Ofthe four states granted membership in NATO after 1949, Spain came last. Its path
into the Alliance in many ways resembled the Mediterranean pattern, but it also had
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significant similarities to the German case. When the country officially became a member
of NATO in 1982, this was but the seal of approval on some thirty years of military
cooperation between (mostly) the United States and Spain.
Already in the early 1950s American plans existed to bring Spain into NATO. From
the American perspective, the country's strategic importance consisted of three factors.
First,
from the standpoint of air traffic the peninsula has become, if not exactly a
bridge, at least an important way station between the two continents. [...]
Looked upon as an "outpost" ofEurope, Spain also offers to military strategists
the promise of a last-ditch European stand against an invasion from the East... 35
As a third issue of strategic importance, Spanish control over the seas surrounding the
Iberian peninsula was considered a bonus in the West's aspiration to deny the Soviets
access to the Atlantic from across the Mediterranean. Spanish harbors and bases were
deemed excellent locations to host NATO ships and to extend coordinated air and sea
action. That fascism still ruled the country was viewed by many as a further signal of
Spanish anti-Communism. Says Antonio Marquina,
With respect to the threats to Spanish national security, the Franco regime was
profoundly anti-communist ~ a consequence of the Civil War — and considered
that the fundamental objectives of the Soviet Union were clearly expansionist
regarding the West. Spain would thus find itself, in Franco's view, involved in
any European war between the Soviet Union and NATO. 36
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Still, the fact is that Spain remained a dictatorship. Its ruling regime was blamed not
only for the crimes committed during the Civil War, but it stood accused for its pro-Axis
stance during the War as well. It was an "outcast among nations", having been denied
membership in the UN, and it was refused the economic aid given to Western Europe. The
outbreak of the Cold War helped Spain to emerge as a member of the international
community, although not a respectable one. Says Angel Vinas,
Spain's value as a potential ally was not lost on U.S. security planners and
Franco's strong anti-communism complemented the American need to deploy
forces in Spain. 37
The change in the evaluation of Spain was followed by a number of lesser agreements
and, in 1953, an important one with the United States, in which the Spanish government
authorized the Americans to establish, maintain, and use bases, military and transit
facilities, and oil pipelines on Spanish territory. In exchange, Spain was given significant
American economic aid and the pretext of respectability. Says Theodore J. Lowi,
As in the contemporary American decision to rearm Germany, the US process
of deciding to establish bases in Spain reflected the pangs of a reversal of
policy required because of a victorious war turned out to be an unhappy
peace... [T]he most immediate, or most visible, objective was strengthening the
defense ofNATO by extra-NATO means... 38
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After the initial refusal to allow Spain entry into NATO in 1949 (originally only
Portugal supported its membership), Spain did not for a while openly press for membership.
The American assistance in the rebuilding of the Spanish economy, as well as the protection
provided by the U.S. presence, helped General Franco's regime to survive, and the
occasional stopover visits by John Foster Dulles to inform Spain about NATO decisions did
not go unnoticed. Already in 1955, the American government viewed the idea of Spanish
membership in NATO favorably. 39 One is hard pressed to see these acts as anything other
than American opportunism in the face of a more important antagonist. Had its NATO
partners been willing, the United States would have, without hesitation, gone ahead with
incorporating Spain into the Alliance ~ even though Spain would not have satisfied the
requirement of being a stable democracy.
Much support to the proposal was granted by the British and the French governments,
and even West Germany gave it some thought. However, liberal opposition, and the outright
protests from lesser Allies (e.g., Denmark, Norway, and Belgium) throughout the 1950s and
1960s made it impossible for Spain to join NATO. Spanish sentiments, too, hindered the
process. NATO in Spain was widely identified with American "interference" on Spanish
territory. The United States, on the other hand, was often blamed for Spanish problems after
the conclusion of the bases agreement between the two countries. As Whitaker points out,
39
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"For a variety of reasons, [...] the agreement was opposed from the start by some elements
addicted to the regime as well as by most of its adversaries."40
American bases in Spain were often blamed for rising prices and everyday economic
problems as well as for "propping up" the Franco regime. Communist-influenced labor
groups opposed everything American on principle. Those in the pro-Franco camp,
meanwhile, were ridden with xenophobia, or disliked America because of its "crudeness"
or Protestantism.
While America and the Americans were often seen in unfavorable terms, no such
images of the Soviet Union existed. As a matter of fact, left-wing forces in Spain thought
ofthe USSR as the power that had helped the "democratic" cause during the Civil War. In
contrast,
The United States became a firm ally of the Franco dictatorship in order to
secure for itself the use of military bases and facilities [...] This arrangement
provoked anti-American sentiment... 41
Franco's dictatorship, repressive as it was, had stimulated some economic
development. After his death in 1975, King Juan Carlos became head of state, and
considerable democratization followed. In the new atmosphere, Spain joined its Western
40
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European neighbors in the Council ofEurope, and the issue ofNATO membership re-emerged.
Those who argued for membership as a way to stabilize the political life of the
country were quickly reminded that in Greece and Turkey NATO membership had not been
enough to immunize these countries against military coups. The Communists argued that
membership would ignite new conflicts between East and West, and that it would upset the
military balance. Those who wanted to see the return of Gibraltar to Spain maintained that
since Britain is more powerful than Spain, NATO would always support the
United Kingdom on the issue of Gibraltar; consequently, membership would
restrain Spain's ability to maneuver. 42
The Soviets, too, did not want another NATO enlargement. Their anti-membership
campaign was all the more influential because of their role in the Civil War. Even approval
of the Spanish desire for the return of Gibraltar was included in the Soviet proposals.
Support for membership inside Spain was more guarded. Between 1977 and 1982 the
leading Christian Democratic Union saw the benefits of joining the alliance as: (1) a
reduction of the chances for a military coup, and (2) the establishment of closer ties with
(Western) Europe through admission to European institutions. From a NATO perspective,
Spain's request to join the organization was received with some doubt. First of all, Franco's
heritage still frightened some people. Also, Spanish wishes to link membership in NATO
to that in the European Economic Community were received lukewarmly. The issue of
Gibraltar was dismissed out of hand.
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From a geostrategic view, however, Spain seemed to be a definite gain It could
prevent the Soviet Union from becoming the most important naval power in the
Mediterranean. During a Soviet attack, it could serve as a fallback position if all else failed.
As Snyder remarked,
NATO forces could stage from Spanish air and naval bases and retreat to those
bases if the war in Central Europe went badly. [...] Access to Spanish bases
could assume special importance for U.S. plans to move military forces
perhaps through the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to the Persian
Gulf 43
Existing Spanish-American ties, too, predisposed Spain toward entry to the Alliance.
Membership, Spain was told, would result in the creation of an Iberian Command, to
include Portugal and Spain. While the military was broadly skeptical of the country's new
civilian leadership, "the armed forces, as a whole, [took] a position in favor of Spanish
participation in NATO."44 Spanish membership, it was supposed, could be beneficial in
another way. NATO allies were worried about the instability of Portugal, a country that
after the end of dictatorship was then experiencing a series of coups, thereby reducing its
reliability as a partner. Finally, after seven years of deliberation (and almost thirty years
after the conclusion of the first U.S. -Spanish bases agreement), membership was granted
to Spain in 1982.
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D. CONCLUSION
From these case histories it seems clear that arguments against enlargement could not
outweigh purely (geo)strategic considerations. All four of the previous enlargements were
evidently granted because of these countries' strategic significance, as related to the rivalry
between East and West.
The world of the 1990s is surely different from even 1982. Still, it is striking that
many NATO members, who appear eager today to dissuade the Alliance from widening
toward Eastern Europe, did not have the same kind of reservations then. That some of those
countries were less than democratic at the time when they were approved for membership,
or that they had interests conflicting with one another's or with those of established
members of the Atlantic Community were brushed aside by the reasoning that these issues
were not important when the containment of the Soviet Union was at stake. In fact, neither
ofthe four latecomers had much to show to support the existence of a stable democracy: at
the most, they were trying to create one. The Federal Republic was not even a sovereign
state, much less a democratic one, when negotiations about membership in the Alliance
began. More importantly, its potential membership was widely used by Bonn to gain more
of the sovereignity it needed. 45 In this respect, NATO membership, rather than being
withheld, was expected to be beneficial to help stabilize these countries — particularly so
45
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in the case of the Federal Republis and Spain. It is, therefore, a lame argument to dismiss
NATO enlargement on this ground, particularly the way The New York Times did in an
editorial, when it stated,
Some prospective members, like the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, are
on the way to establishing democracies and market economies, but are not
there yet. [...] Rushing expansion would undermine the principles the alliance
was established to protect. 46
Neither were the questions of ethnic minorities abroad (as in the case of Greece and
Turkey), and their potential for disrupting the harmony among members, given much
consideration. One could argue that the Greek-Turkish conflict over the issue of Cyprus
has been so dangerous as to almost eliminate the benefits NATO gained from including
these two countries, yet they have both remained members of the Alliance. While not
precisely an ethnic conflict, the division of Germany filled many West Germans with dread.
The possibility that the occasion might arise when they would have to face their East
German brothers and fight them was so repulsive as to almost torpedo the whole question
of rearmament. 47 In light of this, it is surprising that today experts would fear so much that
similar conflicts might erupt between the East European applicants.
The question whether the prospective member states were stable market economies
did not emerge in the cases of earlier enlargements. Originally, when all European members
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were "equally" weak at the end of World War II, it was perhaps natural that their actual
economic potential did not come to the fore when deciding on membership. In the case of
both the original members and the latecomers, membership was extended to allow them
enjoyment of the advantages arising from burden-sharing. This was supposed to aid these
countries in creating a more reliable self-defense for themselves. Curiously enough, even
in the face of obvious disputes regarding intra-alliance burden-sharing the question of
dismantling the alliance or expelling an underpaying member never arose. 48 This issue
should arguably have been given more thorough consideration, at least in the case of Spain,
since from the 1970s, burden-sharing disputes have often poisoned the spirit of community.
All of these considerations have been given much attention since the end of the Cold
War. One can only conclude that the situation must have changed so much that the
arguments that in years past did not manage to stop the widening ofNATO are now able
to do so. If the notion of such a significant change is accepted, however, is it not also
48
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natural that the questions that need be asked should have changed? Is it possible that, in this
entirely new era, past experiences ofNATO enlargement can no longer be of guidance?
An additional remark should be made, however. If the situation is not as desperate
today as it was during previous enlargements, when the need for immediate action
encouraged the Allies to waive relevant requirements, paradoxically, even this could be
favorable to current applicants. In such a case, present requirements could arguably be more
lenient since there is no immediate threat.
This question leads to the examination in Chapter III that will use a set of three
alternative scenarios that might become prevalent in Russia in order to establish the
relevance of the arguments above.
35
36
m. THE "RUSSIAN MENACE"
I rp | here is a certain awkwardness in the way the West has treated first the Soviet
t««« Union, and later Russia since the 1990 London Declaration. 49 Then, the issue of
utmost importance was to come to terms with the fact that the Cold War was about to end,
and to define the nature and functions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the
future. Since the question of NATO's expansion has emerged, Russia has been mostly
hostile to the idea of widening the Alliance toward the East. Its prestige as a great power
is already threatened, and it would become more so should the widening ofNATO happen.
In many ways, the Russians fear that such a development would go against what they view
as legitimate Russian security interests, including that of possessing a substantial sphere of
interest (or influence) in the "not-so-far-abroad". Indeed, the single reference to allowing
Poland to join NATO was abandoned with haste. 50 Many experts have consistently warned
NATO against enlargement, citing what they say are legitimate Russian interests. Others,
on the contrary, have insisted that to cater to Russia's desires in this matter is equal to
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abandoning all designs to widen the Alliance other than those that would include Russia as
well.
Chapter HI will contemplate some of the more obvious paths Russia might choose to
take, their relationship to historical trends and the characteristics of Russian behavior in the
international arena. It will also discuss the question of whether Russian approval or
disapproval of NATO enlargement should be taken at face value, or, indeed, taken into
account at all. Three different scenarios will be used to provide a look into a range of
alternative futures.
A. HANDLING RUSSIA
The problem with those who propose putting Russia first in
Western policy is that, for them, there is never a good time
for the Alliance to address any of the tough issues it faces.
- Sen. Richard Lugar 51
While the "Study on NATO Enlargement" 52 makes no references as to which
countries will eventually become members ofNATO, there is a whole section detailing the
future of relations between Russia and NATO, particularly after the widening of the
Alliance. On many occasions NATO officials have stressed the importance of the changes
in the international atmosphere and the relationship between the former Soviet Union and
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the West, declaring the Cold War finished. Consequently, they have urged that NATO be
changed to make it better equipped to cope with the challenges posed by a radically altered
global environment. Nothing, however, seems to have changed the suspicions regarding
Russia's designs on the Continent. Thus, even though the document insists that "the
enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no-one
and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true
cooperation throughout the whole of Europe," it also gives a clear warning about the
influence Russia may try to exert over the issue of which states would be included in
NATO:
[...] NATO decisions, however, cannot be subject to any veto or droit de regard
by a non-member state, nor can the Alliance be subordinated to another
European security institution. 53
The document is very open about the obligations of future members, and about the
treatment a cooperative Russia can expect to receive. The consequences of non-
cooperative Russian behavior are not elaborated on, but the above statement certainly
seems to suggest that NATO has accepted the risks associated with a hostile Russian
Federation. These deliberations are, in effect, the result of a lengthy debate' about future
Russian behavior as suggested by historical evidence, an analysis of current statements and
patterns of behavior, and various predictions on the future of Russia. The understanding
is that, whichever turn Russian foreign policy and military strategy should take, NATO
53
Sections 28 and 27, respectively, in: "Study on NATO Enlargement", ibid., 10.
39
should not to allow its decision-making to become dependent on Russian wishes. What,
then, may have been the major arguments in this debate, and their effect upon the turn of
events as signaled by the Study on NATO Enlargement?
B. THE RUSSIAN IMPERIALIST IDEA
By no means all of the history now being rediscovered fits
comfortably with ideas of liberal democracy.
- S. Frederick Starr 54
For many observers of Russian history, nothing is quite so striking as the apparent
persistence of imperialist designs against neighboring countries. Although historians do
not usually assume that the history of any country proceeds in a strictly cyclical fashion,
there was a certain legitimacy to this notion, at least insofar as Soviet foreign policies
repeated the tendency established by imperial Russia. Today, experts abound who believe
that, after decades of ideology-based expansionism, the Russian Federation is about to
revert to Russia's traditional imperialism again, thereby proving that history repeats itself.
In his acclaimed book, The Russian Traditioa 55 historian Tibor Szamuely showed
the link between the Russian state tradition and the Russian revolutionary tradition,
thereby establishing a powerful explanation regarding the similarities in the behavior of
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imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. In his reckoning, it was the Mongol statesmanship
of the thirteenth century combined with the extraordinary struggle for everyday survival
that created a statist Russian tradition.
[T]he Mongols, though ignorant of algebra, Aristotle and the finer things of
life, were able to give Russia something of more lasting importance: a political
and administrative system, a concept of society, quite unlike anything that was
to be learned in the West. 56
While contesting many of the accepted myths on Russian behavior, historian Edward
L. Keenan nevertheless arrives at the conclusion that there is "astonishing evidence of how
pragmatic and close were the relations between Muscovite and Tatar politicians." 5 7 This
close relationship resulted in the Russians' emergence as the better of the two after
centuries of Mongol rule. It was under the Mongol tutelage that Muscovy became the
strongest among Russian principalities, relying on the absolute power of the autocrat as
contemporary European rulers could not. In the spirit ofMongol despotism, the autocrat
personally owned all the land in the country, and exercised unlimited control over his
subjects. The occasional revolts did not shake the people's belief in the legitimacy of the
system. In the wake of the French Revolution, Russian revolutionary movements emerged
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The mating of revolutionary conspiracy with the Russian State tradition could
hardly be expected to bring a democratic growth, either in Pestel's day [a
reference to the 1825 Decembrist] or generations later. 58
Once the link between Russian and Soviet statism is established, it is only natural to
expect that this relationship manifest itself in the various aspects of policy-making and
behavior. The general understanding is that both tsarist Russia and the USSR were
imperialist. There is disagreement regarding the nature of this imperialism (benevolent or
malevolent, offensive — that is, aiming at subjugating neighboring peoples — or defensive
— striving to fill destabilizing power vacuums). But disagreement about what has
motivated Russian (or, indeed, Soviet) imperialism does not deny Russia's essential
imperialist tradition. While warning that "we should not exaggerate the degree to which
the West has been what we now call democratic" 59 , renowned scholar Martin Malia claims
that Russian expansionism was for geopolitical reasons, and its imperialism was not
exceptional. By this reasoning he nevertheless admits that Russian behavior was, indeed,
imperialist and, he believes, that due solely to its ideology the Soviet system repeated this
pattern of behavior.
In a similarly revisionist interpretation, and while challenging three myths of Russian
imperialism, Alfred J. Rieber nevertheless subscribes to the existence of a range of
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persistent factors that have guided a Russian expansionist policy: economic backwardness,
permeable frontiers, a multicultural state, and cultural marginality:
From the earliest days of the centralized Muscovite state, the great sources of
natural wealth were located on the periphery of the state's authority... There
was thus a natural impulse to advance from this relatively poor resource base
into neighboring territories in order to acquire economic advantages. 60
The population was also affected by traditional Russian/Soviet imperialism. State-
building and empire-building went hand in hand in Russia, thereby resulting in the
widespread belief that Russia was inseparable from its empire. This was a tradition later
encouraged by the Communist Party. To this day, it is a major element of the Russian
psyche. The identity crisis that has accompanied the breakup of the Soviet Union is so
grave, in Richard Pipes' s opinion, that it has relegated the economic disaster to second
place. As Pipes puts it,
The postcommunist states of Eastern Europe had an easier time [...] In Russia,
the situation is far more complicated because of the confusion of nationhood,
statehood, and empire; it is further exacerbated by the fact that communism
was indigenous rather than imposed from abroad. 61
60
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As an important part of the Russian identity, the question of the origins of Russian
imperialism has attracted Russian opinion, too. The drive to enhance Russia's territory was
not always practical, much less reasoned. One of the more fantastic explanations is
Vyacheslav Ivanov's. Hs claimed in 1993 that,
[t]he idea of conquering space originated in connection with the proposition
that the dead can literally be resurrected, as suggested by Fedorov. [...] The
existing space on earth would not suffice in the event of the resurrection of all
the generations that had lived on the planet. 62
Whatever the explanations (and, often, excuses), the fact remains that both Russian
and Soviet behaviors were rooted in imperialism - a tradition which, by the end of World
War II, included the desire to rule Eastern Europe as well. It was originally Stalin's idea,
but by the 1980s Soviet citizens had grown used to being a superpower, with its own
alliance, and morally superior to the West. The question is, then, whether imperialism as
a "persistent rather than permanent" characteristic of Russian statehood (to borrow
Rieber's phrase) will give way to other, more endearing, traits in the future. It must also
be asked whether it should influence NATO decision-making regarding the eastward
enlargement of the Alliance.
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C. THREE SCENARIOS OF FUTURE RUSSIA
For a time the end of the Cold War, like the Russian
Revolution, seemed to prefigure a sharp change m the
direction of Russian history, this time wholly for the better.
[...] That naive euphoria, that belief in the mutation of
history, has been replaced by a growing unease, both
within Russia and outside, about the way in which Russia
might now turn.
- Rodnc Braithwaite 63
In the academic debate of the past few years, three major alternatives about the
Russia of the future have emerged. First is the opinion that the Russia of today is the direct
descendant of tsarist Russia (and, for that matter, of Soviet socialism - which may have
been, with a twist to Lenin's words, the highest stage of imperialism). Adherents to this
argument frequently quote statements and actions of Russian foreign policy resembling the
imperialist traditions of old.
The second line of reasoning expects Russian weakness to continue, perhaps
deteriorating into chaos and, possibly, a further breakup of the Russian Federation. This
interpretation is mostly an extrapolation from the dismal situation in contemporary of
Russia, i. e., its deteriorating economy, the failure of reforms, and ongoing ethnic conflicts.
This argument does not necessarily contradict the first. Proponents of Russian imperialism
themselves admit that it was always dependent on Russia's strength — and the present
period is one of weakness.
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The third, "optimistic", camp (which includes the most ardent believers in the powers
ofdemocracy) considers the current state of affairs in the Russian Federation transitional.
Its supporters expect that Russia will, sooner rather than later, become a Western-type
democracy, since that is the only "logical" development (and the normal course of history,
as Fukuyama might agree). Although Russian leaders have, on occasion, tried to convey
this image, the sincerity oftheir declarations remains questionable, particularly considering
recent developments (e.g., the war in Chechnya, or the possibility of a Communist
comeback). Western logic and Russia have had little to do with one another — at least so
far.
1. The First Scenario: The Imperialist Revival
As the Russian state has found its bearings again it has
reverted to a traditional Russian foreign policy, dictated by
its history and geography, which is one of asserting control
over its neighbors and competing with the world's other
superpower for influence and resources.
- Thomas L. Friedman 64
The three scenarios offer different challenges to NATO (particularly regarding the
expansion of the Alliance), and those challenges, in turn, demand different solutions. In
the first case, if traditional Russian imperialism takes over, NATO is both better and worse
off than it is right now. The return of outright imperialism would, in a sordid way, at least
clarify the present situation. Unfortunately, it would not make handling it easier.
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As the successor to the Soviet state, the Russian Federation inherited a number of
grave problems, many of which are connected to the dismemberment of the USSR. They
include, to list but a few, a significant Russian diaspora in the former republics of the
Soviet Union, the return of military personnel and equipment from the former empire
(including Eastern Europe), and the humiliating fate that befell the military. They are
aggravated by the economic problems resulting from the collapse of a highly centralized
and bureaucratic system of production, the loss of an all-encompassing explanation of life,
and the loss of prestige and great power status.
There are approximately 25 million ethnic Russians in the other former Soviet
republics who, in the course of the recent changes, have been reduced from members of
an imperial nation to simply ethnic minorities. It is in the interest of the Russian state to
protect these minorities, if only indirectly. Many of the former Soviet republics experience
ethnic tensions that Russia tries, or might try in the future, to use to its own benefit. The
West has not shown much desire to become involved in the settlement of these disputes,
thereby providing an opportunity for Russia to create its own solutions. In effect, as
Maxim Shashenkov asserts,
peacekeeping could also become a convenient method of protecting and
defending the interests and rights of Russian and Russian-speaking populations
in the near abroad. [...] Russian assertive peacekeeping in the 'hot spots' of the
FSU reduces the chances of the involvement of other regional powers in what
Russia sees as its 'traditional sphere of influence'. 65
65
Maxim Shashenkov,"Russian Peacekeeping in the 'Near Abroad'", Survival 36, no. 3 (Autumn
1994), 50.
47
The logical question is whether it is the Russian diaspora that the Russian Federation
wishes so desperately to protect or whether, on the contrary, it is the pretext of protecting
Russians abroad that Russia uses as an excuse to intervene in its "traditional sphere of
influence." Some of the non-Slavic states of the former Soviet Union (e.g., in the Baltics,
the Caucasus, or the Transcaucasus) were less than integral parts of the empire, yet now
experience tangible Russian interference. In the future, this pretext might be entirely
abandoned, and a similar influence demanded in some of the Eastern European states on
the grounds that they, too, belong to the Russian sphere. A familiar argument, if ever there
was one.
The Russian military, while showing signs of utter disrepair, is not to be discounted.
It is still by far the biggest in Europe, and certainly the most desperate. Its first instinct is
self-preservation, an inclination that could involve the invention of any number of "new
missions", even reckless ones or ones that discredit democracy. 66 As Braithwaite puts it,
the republics of the "near abroad", therefore, "fear that - as under the tsars - the Russian
66
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military may lead Russia into imperial adventures despite the reassurances of the Foreign
Ministry"67
In the economy, already in the early 1990s it became evident that a semblance of the
Soviet system had to be preserved at all costs. The reforms have stalled, many of them
ending in corruption rather than economic renewal. The distribution of tasks among the
various republics was such that the breakup of the Union necessarily brought suffering to
all. Even the Russian Federation lost out on the deal, and among the many losers was the
military. For it, the losses included strategically important bases, and affected segments
ofthe military (e.g., the Black Sea Fleet), which further reinforced the desire to recapture
parts or all of the former empire. The creation of the CIS and the efforts to make it a
multipurpose community (involved not only in economic cooperation but also in the
security of its members), are seen by some as signaling Russia's resolve to regain its
former territories.
It is when the economic and military necessities team up with the desire to recapture
the prestige of a superpower, or at least conserve the appearance of being a great power,
67
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that the full significance of these factors emerges. Since the rule of Peter the Great, Russia
has always been considered a great power, a status it must, therefore, desperately wish to
preserve. At present, the only remaining proof of that status is Russia's military (first of
all, nuclear) capability. The support given by the military to the establishment of common
defense (and therefore, to the creation of a NATO-like alliance) within the CIS stems
partially from this predicament. Stephen Covington, in an interesting article on Russian
insecurity, explains:
The West must recognize that rather than being the world leader in reforming
a totalitarian communist state, Moscow has chosen a different course for post-
Cold War legitimization of its security needs, its military superpower status. 68
Why states in the near and far abroad fear a return of Russian imperialism can be
partly explained by the great power rhetoric, the daily interference, and the occasional
show of strength the Russian Federation has engaged in ever since its proclamation. To be
sure, this stance could be taken as a gesture at self-reassurance, and is taken by many as
such. But even if that were true, as H. Adomeit maintains,
Nations and governments engaging in 'great power advertising' typically
embody more irrational, unpredictable and contradictory traits than the more
self-assured and self-confident states. 69
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An unpredictable Russia could become far more threatening than a "simply" hostile
one: the world has learnt to cope with the latter, but does not have enough experience with
the former. The unpredictability, together with the often unveiled threats employed by
Russia for policy-making, are often responsible for the fears of the true motives of the
Russian leadership, whether it concerns the strengthening of the CIS integration or
domestic politics.
What would the interests ofNATO dictate regarding the future of the Alliance and
the plans of enlargement should the return of imperialism become indisputable? Many
experts warn that the eastward expansion of NATO cannot but alienate Russia. These
sentiments are enthusiastically picked up by Russians, as in the case of the following
proclamation, found in the Moscow Times :
Russia is in no position to mount an attack on Western Europe, nor to invade
its former East European satellites, even if it were remotely inclined to do so.
Nor is there any reason to suspect that it would try to do this in the foreseeable
future.
On the other hand, given NATO's original purpose as a bastion against the
advance of Soviet power, it is only natural that Russia would do all it could to
resist the alliance's expansion eastward. 70
The counter-argument, in many respects, sounds more convincing. Should Russia
revert to imperialism, a West lulled into a false feeling of security by Russian promises and
assertions would be utterly without the means to control the situation. Another Yalta would
70
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be entirely out ofthe question, since the West could probably not summon the same power
it did during the Second World War. Should imperialism again take over in Russia, would
it not be best to meet it prepared? Would NATO not be better off having at least some
Eastern European countries firmly at its side rather than leave them to be exploited
(strategically and economically) by such a Russia?71
Russia should not, by any means, feel intimidated by NATO enlargement. There is
no question that it would adversely affect Russia's image (though not necessarily its
position) as a great power. It could even be beneficial because it would signal Russian
willingness to assume a benign behavior. Furthermore, enlargement would not threaten
Russia's existence: that was never in the interest ofNATO, and it is not, now. As William
Safire stated in the New York Times .
Fear ofRussian paranoia must not determine the defense of Europe. NATO has
proved itself to be peaceful (and our C.F.E. commitments add to that
assurance). But as Russia recovers and rearms, as history suggests it will,
71
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Moscow's imperialist urge might well rise again — and then it would be too
late and "provocative" to redraw the defense line. 72
This would be equal not only to allowing Russia the upper hand, but to the West
losing face in the process — a very dangerous thing when facing a high-context culture
(i.e., one where face-saving and personal contacts are uppermost in negotiators' minds). 73
In order to prevent Russia from being completely alienated by NATO enlargement
the West might do well to provide it with some form of compensation74 — but not the right
to decide who may become a new member in the alliance and when. When it threatens the
return of the Communists or a takeover by the extreme nationalists, the Yeltsin
government and the President bind themselves to a "position of weakness" (Schelling 75)
and use it as a bargaining chip. The problem with this stance is that it may be effective not
only abroad, but also vis-a-vis the government's domestic opponents. Any compromise
that might today be accepted as necessary to pacify right-wing opposition to the Yeltsin
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government may easily appear in the constitution of Russia should the next president come
from that part of the political spectrum. Furthermore, while public declarations mostly
oppose the eastward widening ofNATO, there are those even within the political elite who
do not seem to fear it. The quotation below makes one question the sincerity of the present
leadership in this regard. One is tempted to believe that this is nothing more but a
bargaining chip to be used at Moscow's convenience, as it is implied by the following
piece of news:
The chairman ofthe parliamentary defense committee said Monday that Russia
should be made an "associate member" ofNATO and head off a nationalist
backlash against the enlargement of the alliance. Sergei Yushenkov told a press
conference the expansion ofNATO was not, in itself, a threat, as it was a long,
cumbersome process that he believed would actually weaken NATO as an
alliance.
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Less benevolent is the hope some Russians harbor that the issue can be divisive
enough to lead to serious problems within the Alliance itself. 77
It is possible that Russia, in the long term, will manage to avoid the trap of
imperialism. It is less likely that it could ever be happy about NATO enlargement. This is
a matter that Russia should be forced to come to terms with, if for no other reason than to
prove how democratic its policies really are.
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2. The Second Scenario: Weak, Chaotic Russia
[T]here is an uneasiness in the air, borne of fear for the
future and unanswered questions.
- David Satter 78
The second possibility is just as threatening as the first. One reason for this is the
inherent instability and unpredictability of such an outcome. What could happen if the
center in the Russian Federation totally lost control of its subjects is difficult to say. The
further breakup of Russia is possible - with all its dismal consequences. These could
include, e.g., refugee flows, the collapse of the state, the emergence of new states,
disregard for international law and order, increase in international terrorism, uncontrolled
~ and uncontrollable -- redistribution of resources, and nuclear proliferation. This is a
process that, according to Malia, resembles the smuta19 (the "time of troubles") of the early
seventeenth century.
Another danger inherent in this scenario is that never in the history of Russia has a
period of weakness been followed by democracy. In fact, the opposite usually has held
true: chaos and weakness inevitably ended with the emergence of renewed trust in (indeed,
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reverence for) a new autocrat. When scholars compare the present Russian political
situation to that of Weimar Germany, they do it with a tone of warning. In an insightful
essay, G. Starovoitova likened post-World War I Germany and post-Soviet Russia as
follows:
Like Russians today, Germans were experiencing a crisis of ethnic identity as
a result of alterations in their political geography and reappraisals of their
recent history. [...] As a result, in our day Russians as well as Germans have
come to associate the ideals and symbols of patriotic unity with totalitarian
regimes. Russia's new democratic authorities can ill afford to remind their
citizens of such ideals, whereas the Russian chauvinist opposition calls for the
restoration of a regime that can whip up patriotic fervor and once again help
the nation survive a time of great difficulty. 80
Thus, the second scenario contains the possibility of the emergence of the first.
Ample evidence exists that many people in Russia believe in the superiority of some form
of autocracy when compared with what they see as the fallibilities of democracy, among
them those who lost out in the changes. These people are even now being led to believe
the "strong Russia"-rhetoric the Communists and the nationalists chant. Communist deputy
in the State Duma V. Ilyukhin in mid- 1995 boldly stated,
There is only one conclusion. In order to save Russia, we need a new president,
a new government and a new legislature. But the first step is replacing the
constitution which is injurious to Russia. The country needs a charter that will
Galina Starovoitova, "Modem Russia and the Ghost of Weimar Germany", in Heyward Isham,
ed.,ibid., 140.
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make the government strong and powerful, will make life certain and just and
will make the people free and happy. 81
Assertions such as the above are no longer discredited. The ardent wish to make
people free and happy (never to allow them to do so on their own) is reminiscent of the
golden days of the Soviet Union. One would not expect to see such rhetoric in a self-
proclaimed and burgeoning democracy, much less the approving nods it has met.
Returning to the question of what would happen if this scenario emerged victorious, there
are two options. If, in the mid- to long-term, the smuta were replaced by a superimposed
autocratic order, the first (imperial Russia) scenario and its consequences would
automatically apply. If, on the other hand, Russia itself broke into pieces, the situation
would be different.
Many of the threats in such a scenario would require the interference of a regional
or international organization other than NATO (e.g., the European Union, the OSCE, or
the United Nations). The potential security threats posed by a fragmenting Russia are
similar to those experienced during the fragmentation of the (Russian-proclaimed) "sick
man of Europe", the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, with the notable
difference that it would not only happen on a much larger scale, but that it would also
happen in a different, more interdependent world ~ one with nuclear weapons. It may not
be possible to prevent the virus from spreading the disease, but fighting it without the




serum represented by NATO would be foolish. There is a role for NATO in this scenario,
and the bigger NATO is, the greater the area of regional stability — as against the chaos
in Russia.
3. The Third Scenario: Democracy in Russia, at Last
Once again people are searching for Russia's special
'mission'. This time the most widespread idea is the old
one turned upside down: Russia is fulfilling its mission to
save the world from the destructiveness of artificial states
and social formations, to demonstrate that socialism [...] is
not viable [...] I refuse to believe that such a 'mission' has
an iota of merit!
- Dmitni Likachev 82
There are those who sincerely believe that, against all odds, this time Russia will go
through a radical change and emerge as a Western-type democracy. The West cannot
imagine that Russia, after having let go of the other former Soviet republics, could now
re-create a democratic empire. Not so some of the Russians when they reassure the West
about the depth of their desire for democracy and in the same breath talk about their
"responsibilities" in the near abroad. It is perhaps their limited experience with democracy
that allows them the optimism to assume this.
There is, however, a measure of desperation involved in Russian attempts to disavow
the notions of an autocratic past. Clearly, they themselves see the negative historical
pattern. In the above quoted essay, Likachev tries to discredit the "cliche ... that Russia had
82
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no democratic traditions, no normal state authority that in any way took the interests of the
people into account"83 However one might sympathize with his desire to provide Russians
with historical evidence of a seed of democracy in their culture, it is impossible to lose
sight of the fact that, on balance, Russia has been an autocratic empire for centuries.
Szamuely would have probably said that whatever democratic institutions or impulses may
have existed in the Russian Empire existed only within the notion of equal slavery before
the autocrat.
84
Nevertheless, at this point, it is not yet entirely impossible that a democratic Russia
will emerge when the present chaotic situation is cleared. Let us, therefore, picture a
Russia as democratic as its most democratic-minded citizens would like it to be. This
would, indeed, be a serious challenge to the existence of NATO. Ever since the 1990
London Declaration the future of the Alliance has been questioned. While some experts
and scholars oppose NATO enlargement or even the continuation of the military
cooperation within the existing organization, it is simply too early to rely on the OSCE —
just as it had been too early to entrust the feeble League of Nations with the fate of the
world before World War II. To forget that it is not only Russia that needs reassurances (but
that the West, too, is entitled to getting its own from the Russian Federation) is just as
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is more legitimacy in doing the latter, considering recent Russian involvements in affairs
of its neighbors and of the world.) As John J. Maresca warned in Defense News .
This is not a suggestion to isolate Russia. [...] Rather, it is a suggestion to keep
NATO strong as long as it is needed... the West should not be blind to Russia's
current activities in the newly independent states around its periphery. [...] To
leave Moscow completely unchallenged will only lead to greater problems
later.
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When Moscow complains about not being treated as a great power should be, or not
having a say in NATO enlargement, one should remember an earlier enlargement. The
accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Alliance was conducted under much
more disheartening circumstances, in the middle of the gravest period of the Cold War.
Then, even the Soviet superpower's threats and assurances could not put a halt to
expansion. In comparison, allowing all four Visegrad countries to become members of
NATO would not require quite as much courage. To concede to Russia's wishes in this
issue might enhance Russia's public image, but it would not necessarily aid democracy in
Moscow — and, some argue, might further harm it. 86
Additionally, similarly to the "Russia first" resorting, a significant argument could
be made in favor of the Central and East European applicants. NATO members should not
forget that dragging out the process is another way of signaling the undesirability of the
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Central and East Europeans As James W. Morrison puts it, "It could suggest that the West
is not sympathetic to these states and their perceived vulnerability, and that the West does
not view these states as part of Europe or as important."87 This, of course, undermines the
essence of the democratic reasoning.
Again, the conclusion is similar. Expanding the Alliance is entirely possible and
connected to the future ofNATO in a simple way. IfNATO were to disassemble, it would
do so regardless of the number of its members. If it were to be transformed into an
organization of collective security, then the fact that some Eastern European states were
allowed to join it earlier than others would not make a difference.
D. WHAT HAS HAPPENED SO FAR?
But frank recognition of a sharp break with the comfortable
illusions of perestroyka is unsettling to too many Western
political, as well as Sovietological, interests to be readily
accepted.
-- Martin Malia *
The three scenarios depicted above (imperial Russia, weak/anarchic Russia, and
democratic Russia) boil down to one significant difference between the individual camps.
This difference is the argument whether nations are prone to follow a historically
James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments McNair
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prescribed destiny, or can and do change, thereby altering the course of history. In his
essay, "A Different Dance", Leon Axon calls the former reasoning "Historical", the latter,
"Romantic". 89 The Historical school expects Russia to revert to type, while the Romantics
point out that democratic change, as proven by the examples of the F.R.G. and Japan, is
possible. Actually, this latter point is not entirely correct. As General W. Odom reminds
us, the shift from totalitarian to democratic regimes in Germany (and Japan) was
accomplished under the presence of massive occupying forces. 90 This could not be the case
in Russia.
Aron believes that while neither camp is totally correct in its expectations, there is
a chance that what we see as renewed imperialist strife might, in fact, be the "muddling
through" aspect of a change without precedents rather than the return of outright
imperialism. In the recent history of the Russian Federation, however, ample reasoning can
be found for both arguments.
Even before the breakup, it was obvious that a fairly strong camp in favor of the
Soviet system existed inside the USSR. In domestic as well as the foreign policy-making,
the opinions from these people resonated with the confidence of the previous seventy-odd
years. A particularly early expression of the present Russian warnings about the
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consequences of NATO enlargement eastward can be found in a 1991 issue of the
newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda . The search for new policies, it says,
is wide and includes such options as full neutrality, bilateral and multilateral
agreements, and even the desire to join NATO... [This] evokes a degree of
surprise, even bewilderment. [...] After all, with the dismantling of the WTO
military structure we have gone only halfway towards a safe future for Europe
— the Eastern half of the way. 91
This interpretation blatantly ignores the fact that the WTO fell apart due to the
pressure exerted by its own membership, which is hardly the case for NATO. It shows,
however, that even when democracy seemed to be acquiring a pleasant shine in the Soviet
Union, there were those who looked upon the alterations in the post-World War II status
quo with growing resentment. It also indicates that some in Russia not only oppose
NATO's eastward expansion, they oppose the idea of expansion per se 92
Following the declaration ofindependence of the Russian Federation and the breakup
ofthe Soviet Union, the West believed that Russia would become a democratic state. Many
perhaps thought this would occur overnight. Not only did that not happen, but after a
period ofwavering democratic urges, a state of quasi-autocracy reasserted itself, not in the
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least because democratic institutions seemed to be too weak to effectively handle the many
problems Russia has been facing.
One thing is certain: what the West gloried in as Russia's choice of democracy leaves
much to be desired. The first few months of the newly established Russian Federation were
spent in a state of blissful euphoria ~ both in Russia and (perhaps more so) in the West.
Many are the experts who remarked on how optimistic the Russian leadership and the
population were regarding the nature and size of the help the West would give.
The widely held notion of the supremacy of the Western model led most Russians
to believe that switching to democracy would be, if not entirely painless, at least quick.
The first few months of 1 992, therefore, were characterized by a desire to cooperate, and
a show of democratic feelings. In those early days, the failure of the Soviet state still
loomed large in the minds of the population, unaltered by images of the failure of reforms.
After all, what else could explain Russia's willingness to let go of the republics of the
former Soviet Union, vote against Serbia, a traditional Russian protege, in the UN Security
Council, and support domestic economic and political reforms on an unheard-of scale?
From the end of 1991 to about the middle of 1992 Russia reinvented itself: in
international and regional organizations, in its attitude toward the United States and the
West, in its understanding of its own roles and responsibilities. Just as domestic economic
reforms signaled an end to an era in history, so the image projected toward the
international community showed a dramatic departure from previous behavior. The
overwhelming feeling was, as H. Adomeit quotes the Russian foreign minister saying, that
64
[y]et another failure "to integrate into the democratic community of states and
thus the world economy [...] would amount to a betrayal of the nation and the
final slide of Russia down to the category of third rank states". 93
The resultant sense of urgency allowed the Westernizers of Russia to claim a short-
lived victory over the traditional arguments of the Slavophile/Eurasian camp. It was this
behavior that convinced the West that Russia was well on its way to democracy, and that
it was in the West's best interest to promote a "Russia first" approach. The early omens
of a much less comfortable future were, for the time being, disregarded. The official
rhetoric from Russia did not, at this time, belie the expectations. The hope in the
emergence of a "new international order" was reflected in the renewed interest in various
international organizations, among them the United Nations and the CSCE. Initial Russian
cooperation seemed to reinforce these hopes.
It was in this atmosphere that the future necessity ofNATO came into question. It
was this hopefulness that resulted in the changes ofNATO military doctrine and strategic
aims — as announced by the Rome Declaration of 1991. 94 This positive Russian behavior
allowed NATO to put the question of enlargement temporarily aside. And the remnants of
this optimism are responsible for many of the arguments opposing the eastward widening
93
Hannes Adomeit, ibid., 44.
94
"The Alliance's Strategic Concept (Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8th November 1991", NATO
Handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, 1995), 235-248.
65
of the Alliance. In this benevolent atmosphere, Russia insisted, the need for NATO
enlargement was small, the need for pacifying and aiding Russia great.
Unfortunately, this "internationalist", accommodating approach remained at the
center of foreign policy for about six months only. By then, many serious criticisms had
emerged. One was the fact that Western support did not fulfill Russian expectations.
Second, that many among the Russian intelligentsia accused Russian foreign policy of
failing to identify and promote the national interest. Third, foreign minister Kozyrev came
to be seen as too pro-Western, too obliging. Finally, lacking a political party's backing,
nobody but the reformers themselves seemed to propagate these policies. 95
What has happened to bring these changes about? As in any state, in Russia, too,
foreign and security policy is strongly connected to, and dependent on, the twists and turns
of domestic politics. While reforms were attractive to the population, Communists and
nationalists alike had less to offer the people. When the reforms came to be seen as
ineffective, hardliners and centrists with their suggestions to return to traditional Russian
policies, began to gain popularity. First, economic reformers were ousted from the
government. It was, some said, the natural swing back of the pendulum after the swing in
the opposite direction provided by perestroika. The reality is probably less reassuring. A
RAND Corporation study explains that the removal of economic reformer Gaidar was
probably behind a startling speech by Foreign Minister Kozyrev at the Stockholm CSCE
Renee de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation. Russian security strategies and foreign policy
in the post-imperial era , Adelphi Paper no. 289 (IISS: London, 1994), 25-26.
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meeting, a speech that described a hardline, irredentist Russian foreign policy -- delivered,
Kozyrev subsequently explained, to remind the participants of what "might" happen
should Russia's democrats (i.e., Yeltsin) be ousted. 96
While for the past five years the Russian Federation has been busy building its own
identity and statehood, the nature of this identity has increasingly emerged as assertive, at
times aggressive. It is unclear how much of this rhetoric is just that and how much it
reflects the present reality of Russian politics. Nevertheless, the possibility of the
reinstatement of the Russian statist-imperialist tradition has been confirmed from different
corners.
President Boris Yeltsin's rule has been hardly what could be called "uneventful".
Many of those events are among the sources of doubt regarding the nature of the present
Russian state, and its possible future choices. Starting from the position of
(quasi)democratic opposition to the Soviet government, by the end of his (first?)
presidency he has been forced to make allowances to the more and more popular
nationalist movement, and even to his Communist opposition.
The very actions hailed by many as protecting the fragile democracy in Russia are
scorned by others who see them as less than democratic in themselves. Today, Yeltsin is
supported by the West because he is seen as the lesser and known evil, and not because he
is any great democrat. His decision to disband Parliament in 1993 was unconstitutional
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and, according to Satter, a deliberate plot to boost his presidency. The result of this was
"the loss of the possibility to lay the basis for an enduring constitution and, with it, the rule
of law."97 Russians also ended up with a constitution that strengthened the president to
such an extent as to allow him to govern almost entirely by decrees. Clearly, Yeltsin has
grown into his nickname, "Tsar Boris."98 So far, Russia's yet uncrowned autocrat has
managed to depict himself as the West's only choice, allowing him to enjoy the fruits of
unfailing support abroad. He does not hesitate to use his "moderation" to advantage. Often,
Yeltsin's public appearances are aimed at frightening the West into extending further
support to his regime. In a recent public address, for example, he tried to scare the West
as follows:
[W]hat worries me most of all is the absence so far of firm guarantees of the
irreversibility of the changes that are taking place. There is no guarantee that
five years from now new presidential elections will be held. Russia is again at
a crossroads.
99
By the end of 1993, it had become obvious that the period of enthusiastic changes
was over. The Russian liberal Yuri Afanasyev publicly rued the passing of the era of
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reforms, claiming that the domestic political struggles in 1993 signaled the "return of the
military", the "foxhole mentality" of the leadership. He sadly confirmed that the reforms
had barely scraped the surface. 100 Last year, when testifying to the U.S. Congress, well-
known financier George Soros captured another aspect of the link between Russia's
domestic political agenda and its foreign policies. In his testimony he warned that
Russia and the other successor states are in need of outside assistance to make
headway with their internal transformation. They do not perceive issues of
external security as a threat; rather, they see them as opportunities to divert
attention from their economic failure and to mobilize political support. 101
This, in some respects, resembles the situation prior to the Russo-Japanese war, when
Russia attempted to eliminate the domestic threats to the legitimacy of the autocracy. The
fields of security and foreign policy, most important in respect to NATO enlargement,
have also been subject to the fluctuations of domestic politics. Creating a separate national
identity and the requisite political ideas is not easy, particularly when the past is not
exactly full of examples to follow.
The most important foreign and security policy decisions and documents are the
products of 1992 and 1993. Unfortunately, since then, many of their stipulations have been
called into question. While during 1991 and 1992 the Foreign Ministry, staffed with a team
100
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of reformers, enjoyed the support of the leadership, from the end of 1993 the centrist and
extremist forces in the State Duma have grown strong enough to alter many pro-Western
policies.
102
It has become obvious that the Duma's and the Defense Ministry's views on
the conduct and essence of foreign policy are closer than are the Duma's and the Foreign
Ministry's. Of course, it is inevitable considering the changes in the Duma's membership
since 1991 — reformers and moderates have, by now, been in many cases replaced by
moderates and extremists.
The first signs of the successes of the Defense Ministry are to be found in the new
Russian military doctrine of 1993, often dubbed Russia's "Monroe Doctrine." In it, the
Russian Federation essentially recreated the idea of a wider sphere of influence in the
former Soviet republics, inasmuch as they were given a special status as the "near abroad".
Already in the summer of 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev warned that "... Russia
cannot be a successful member of the international community without the ex-Soviet
states."
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In effect, Russia has pursued a neo-imperial policy and the restoration of hegemonic
influence in the other republics of the former Soviet Union. The process is symbolized by
the attempts to create a CIS-wide security cooperation, much in the vein ofNATO, that
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in time could negotiate with NATO as its equal. While the need to temporarily reconstruct
some form ofcommon defense in the FSU is understandable, the methods Russia has used
to make the other republics comply with its designs (e. g., threats of economic sanctions,
coercion, support to ethnic minorities, and blackmail — as in the case of Georgia) are not
conducive to the behavior of the benevolent protector of neighboring small states. The
efforts to assure Russian "peacekeeping" a free hand and even make it attractive within the
UN are "... clearly a perceptible desire for an internationally sanctioned droit de regard
over its former colonies." 104 Russian attempts at reintegration of the two other Slavic
republics, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, although not yet successful in the case of the
second, are indicative of the spirit of the empire-reconstructors.
These trends are symptomatic of the demise of the pro-Western foreign policy the
Russian Federation had initially cultivated. However, as de Nevers warns, "... current
trends in foreign and security policy should not be written off as a temporary reaction, or
as a concession to conservative forces at home. They reflect a deeper reassessment of
Russia's national interests and identity." 105 Apparently, this identity is different from the
ideals of Russian Westernizers, and much more so from the West's.
The major differences among these Russian political trends had only begun to show
when the explosive issue ofNATO enlargement forced them into the open. What in 1991
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was ridiculed by Krasnaya Zvezda became, by 1994, an issue of immediate importance.
Yeltsin's 1993 approval for Polish NATO membership (or, what the West understood to
be his cautious approval) was quickly revoked and qualified: it was suggested that NATO
enlargement without Russian membership was not to be allowed. Russia and the West
increasingly disagreed about NATO expansion. Presently the Foreign Minister of Russia,
then head ofForeign Intelligence Service, Yevgeniy Primakov warned that Russia was "far
from indifferent to which bloc extends its area of responsibility up to our borders". 106 With
this message the Russian leadership interpreted NATO expansion within the context of its
1 993 Military Doctrine which lists the "expansion of military blocks and alliances to the
detriment of the interests of military security of the Russian Federation" as a source of
external danger. 107
The document also separates military dangers and threats, the latter being more
serious in nature — relegating the enlargement ofNATO to the category of "danger". In
this respect, the rejection ofNATO expansion seems symptomatic of the struggle that is
raging between the various political forces — what the military doctrine deemed of
moderate significance is now being presented to the public as an issue of utmost
importance. In this we can see the signs of a Russian departure from the policies of the
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early post-Soviet state. Then, as it was confirmed in the military doctrine and elsewhere,
the most important task was to retain influence in the former Union republics and,
wherever possible, promote integration with them. Today, this has been all but eclipsed
by the imperative of not allowing NATO to expand, or at least getting significant
concessions from the Alliance should it decide to go along with the plan.
Perhaps this is the true meaning of the more and more menacing Russian stance on
the issue. Yeltsin says that the expansion of NATO "will mean a conflagration of war
throughout Europe, for sure. [...] That's why I'm against NATO enlargement. When
NATO approaches the borders of the Russian Federation, you can say that there will be
two military blocs, and this will be a restoration of what we have already had, [...] to the
detriment ofEuropean security." 108 It is possible that what he is really saying is that further
concessions from the West are necessary for Russia to swallow its pride. It would be
welcome news if speeches such as this were given for such reasons rather than due to the
unfavorable changes in the relative strengths of various political factions.
In statements such as this, Yeltsin speaks as if he were the protector of the status quo
in East Europe — a fact that many observers connect to his plans to run for the presidency
These observers say that it is expected from the Russian leader that he show strength and
"courage" to his people, thereby countering the strength and decisiveness both the
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Communists and the radical nationalists emanate. 109 In truth, fifty years ago the Soviet
Union created a belt of semi-sovereign satellites to protect itself, conveniently forgetting
that it had no legal right to do so. In this respect, what is happening today is closer to
creating a new status quo than disturbing one. (Also, what Eastern Europe is experiencing
at present could hardly be called a status quo — it is more like mild chaos.)
Often, hostile remarks from various Russian politicians, not excepting the president
himself, have been explained as some sort of "publicity trick". In a 1995 article in Foreign
Policy , Kozyrev addressed the question of Russian superpower rhetoric as follows:
[T]he West is not yet accustomed to the fact that public opinion and the
legislature play a similar, if not a more important, role in Russian foreign
policy than they play in the United States and Western Europe.We would be
miserable democrats if we ignored various political trends in parliament and
public sentiments, even ifwe find them highly disagreeable. 110
It is one thing to listen to such "disagreeable" arguments, and another to heed them,
if for nothing else, than to promote president Yeltsin's chances of re-election. In the end,
Foreign Minister Kozyrev could do little but try to accommodate these forces while also
attempting to preserve a semblance of the foreign policy he wished to represent. In his
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person one can see the failure ofRussian reforms. Starting from the aspiration to cooperate
with the West to raise Russia from its isolation, he was first forced to moderate his hopes,
then, to stand by a more assertive foreign policy toward the "near abroad". In the end, he
confirmed that Russia would not stand by idly should NATO attempt to go through with
enlargement. Although Russia signed the Partnership for Peace agreement rather than
being left out, it did so with the understanding that it
might leave PFP ifNATO goes ahead with eastward expansion of the alliance.
[Kozyrev] said that Russia opposes the organization's expansion in principle
and that 'it must be clarified whom NATO intends to defend Europe from'.
Kozyrev and the Foreign Ministry hold the most dovish, pro-Western position
on NATO's expansion and East-West cooperation among the entire Russian
policy-making establishment. 111
In the end, even this was not enough. After the struggles of the past couple of years,
in January 1996 the "great Westernizer" himself was forced to resign. With him went the
last hopes of the "Romantic" school of thought, leaving in its wake the image of an
increasingly dangerous Russia, which seems to be passing through the three scenarios
earlier depicted — though in the reverse order. It started out from a democratic ideal, is
now in a near-chaotic state, from which it may conceivably emerge imperialist again.
in




Russian leaders with whom a clear-headed Western plan
[...] could be constructively discussed are being locked into
an increasingly negative posture by the rising crescendo of
highly vocal Russian opposition. There is little to be gained
and a great deal to be risked by more delay [of NATO
expansion]...
- Zbigniew Brzezinski " 2
Many experts warn against NATO enlargement because they believe it would
alienate Russia and lead to the collapse of the democratic movement. Because of this
worry, some suggest it would be better not to go through with the enlargement at all.
Michael Mandelbaum, for example, goes so far as to assert that NATO enlargement is
probably not even necessary (in any case, it might cause more trouble than it is worth). His
opinion is that even ifRussia chooses to antagonize the West, "Because Russia is so weak,
chaotic, and preoccupied with its internal affairs, the West has a long time." 113 A similar
argument was raised by Michael Brown in the Washington Post . 114
Whatever the reasons behind NATO enlargement, as long as Russia is not a member
(and it is generally agreed that as long as NATO remains a collective defense organization,
this will not happen), it will find reason to complain about the process. The widening of
the Alliance in such circumstances will necessarily hurt Russian prestige. It is debatable
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whether it would hurt Russia's interests, unless those are imperialistic. What the West
could do is help Russia preserve its own self-esteem. This could be done by offering,
parallel with the "stick" of enlargement, a "carrot" or even carrots that would help preserve
Russian pride. What must be clearly understood, however, is that it is impossible to have
this (carrot) cake and eat it, too. Russia cannot be compensated for NATO's expansion by
offering it a carrot from the same sack, i.e., a say in what NATO can and cannot do, lest
the West compromise the future of the Alliance. After all, NATO is an association of
sovereign states where decision-making rests in the hand of the membership, not with
some outside actor.
On the other hand, many experts argue, consistently with various NATO documents,
that the eastward extension ofNATO would help project stability and peace into a region
that has been the source ofmany clashes among European powers. Whether it is but a part
of a wider security architecture or the chief guarantor of security in Central and Eastern
Europe,
NATO is the keystone ofthe new European security architecture, by dint of its
past successes, its integrated military forces, the enduring commitment and
leadership of the United States, and NATO's proven capacity to respond
rapidly and effectively to new demands. 115
It is also to be observed that to accept the proposal to enlarge NATO only after
Russia has given proof of aggressive intent may be to wait until it becomes entirely too late
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to do anything — for two reasons. First, because from that moment on, the West would
have to make the move in a hostile atmosphere that could easily lead to misunderstanding
or intentional misinterpretation by such a Russia. It is easy to see that this idea is more a
convenient excuse not to expand the Alliance than an intelligent solution. IfNATO does
not move while Russia can still be reasoned with, why (and how) would it move when
action could result in outright confrontation? Second, NATO is a collective defense
organization, built around the hypothesis of a common threat that the members want
protection against. It is not an OSCE-like loose collective security organization. IfNATO
is to fulfill its mission, its preparedness must be maintained at all times. Consequently,
should Russia become a threat to European security, NATO could not be effectively
introduced in Eastern Europe overnight, as some experts suggest (nor would Russia likely
let it happen). 116 Then, the political consultation and cooperation available today would
hardly compensate for what the Eastern Europeans would be forced to face.
This is the most difficult dilemma of enlargement: how not to allow Russia the right
to dictate the who and when of enlargement, and at the same time not hurt Russian feelings
in a way that could worsen the current precarious situation of its democrats. As Asmus,
Kugler, and Larrabee put it,
The alliance should make a serious attempt to reassure Moscow about NATO
expansion, while recognising that Russia's future is uncertain and that the
Alliance's role in shaping that future is limited. It is also premature to conclude
that NATO expansion can decisively tip the power balance in Moscow.
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Although Russian democrats are understandably concerned that nationalists
will exploit the issue against them, NATO expansion is only one small factor
in the equation that will determine Russia's future. 117
The discouraging fact is that, no matter what the West does, Russia may already be
treading the path of increasing assertiveness and decreasing moderation. At the moment,
"Russia and the West are developing different definitions of what constitutes Eurasian
stability after the Cold War. [...] Russia not only opposes NATO expansion, but holds
views about Europe's ultimate security structure that diminish NATO's role in Europe". 118
Thus, while the handling of this problem will take much ingenuity, it should not, in
the interest of European security, take a long time.
F. CONCLUSION
Russia can either stay within the limits of its zone and
desperately try to find weak points in its boundaries, thus
keeping the West in a condition of permanent alert. Or both
Russia and the West can find civilized ways of co-
operating. This will help secure the development of Russia
as a democratic power.
- Irina Kobrinskaya " 9
It seems that Russia has already chosen a non-Western path. Its persistent rhetoric
about its desire to join the ranks of the liberal democratic nations has been increasingly at
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odds with its ever more assertive foreign and defense policies. In this respect, it is difficult
to believe that an attempt by the West to support Moscow's democrats through restraining
from NATO enlargement could achieve much more than making the job easier for Russia's
very own new nationalists or the Communists.
Critical of William Odom's undisguised support for NATO enlargement, Owen
Harries suggests that the West today is about to make the opposite mistake it made prior
to World War II. Then, the West believed that Nazi Germany could be reasoned with in
the same way as Weimar Germany. Now, he says, it would be a similarly mistaken notion
to act "on the assumption that the policy and attitudes of the struggling democracy in
Moscow are no different [...] from those of its totalitarian Soviet and authoritarian Tsarist
predecessors." 120 His point is just as wrong as it is nicely argued. After all, the
appeasement tactics of the West were partially responsible for allowing Hitler to believe
that he could fulfill his dreams for the Third Reich. There is more reason to suspect that
Russia is hovering at the edge of becoming a totalitarian regime again than to applaud its
miraculous transformation. Furthermore, the solution Harris suggests can easily be seen
as appeasement. The situation, therefore, would be the same as, and not the opposite of,
that of Weimar Germany (possibly with similar consequences). A democratic Russia
would have little to fear ofNATO enlargement, not in the least because of the assurances
NATO has been, and will continue to be, willing to provide. On the other hand, it seems
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strange that, while it is building what it perceives to be its own alliance among the
members ofthe CIS, the Russian Federation would deny NATO expansion on the grounds
that it would threaten Russian interests.
In the event that a truly democratic Russia emerged and managed to stabilize the
country, the issue of the transformation or the total dismantling of NATO could be
considered. Such a transformation would be conducive to the enlargement of the Alliance,
while its elimination would have nothing to do with how many members it might then
have. As long as there is no real democracy in Russia, however, it is not to be assumed that
the boisterous, but so far relatively peaceful, attitude of Russian foreign policy is due to
anything else but the present state of weakness. It is better to be prepared for any
emergency than be caught unawares. In the case of Russia, there is a peculiar correctness
to the old saying, "Trust must be earned".
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IV. HUNGARIAN MEMBERSHIP POTENTIAL
With regard to the common defence, the sharing of roles,
risks and responsibilities embraces a wide range of
contributions by member countries. [...] Precise comparisons
of one type of contribution with another are not possible.
Perceptions vary of the value and the cost of individual
contributions...
- Enhancing Alliance Collective Security [...]. A NATO
Report 121
s the preceding chapters have shown, previous NATO enlargements were
by no means unproblematic, neither were they in keeping with the
requirements set for present applicants. The good opinion of the Soviet Union, against
whose potential aggression the Alliance had been created, was not coveted. On the
contrary, enlargements happened in the face of Soviet threats.
Paradoxically, the "Russia first" argument (which is another way of showing respect
toward one's powerful, resurgent enemy) is often coupled with the opinion that the
applicants would not be able to comply with the requirements ofNATO (thus, they would
be a destabilizing influence). Clearly, both beliefs cannot be held up against enlargement
at the same time. According to the former, "neo-containment" reasoning, enlargement
should not be decided by the Russian Federation. The "Study on NATO Enlargement"
clearly is a step in this direction.
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On the other hand, if the threat is instability, then leaving the region to cope with its
many problems alone might work against the desires of the West. The Yugoslav crisis
indicates that the West does have a vested interest in maintaining the peace of not only its
territory, but also that of the neighboring area. In this case, the fact that the applicants may
not immediately be able to pull their "fair share" is perhaps not as important as the fact that
they are willing to try, and that by enlarging, the Alliance might solve one of the recurring
problems of the Continent. Enlargement would also help balance Germany. As Asmus,
Kugler, and Larrabee put it,
East-Central Europe's democrats well understand that democracy will succeed
only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political,
economic, and military community. The West, too, previously understood this
link — as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. [...] Similarly, NATO
membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in
Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. Those who insist that democratic
credentials must be presented to alliance membership should remember that the
need for a stable security framework is greatest when democracy is most
fragile and threatened. 122
Even if one accepts the fact that the situation has changed since the time Spain joined
NATO, it is difficult to say that current debates about which countries to allow into the
Alliance and in what order, are unprejudiced: some of these debates are based on
perceptions that do not entirely reflect reality. These perceptions, in turn, have been fueled
by a range of factors. Most common among them is the belief that not only would
enlargement be costly to the current membership, but it would also harm the Alliance's
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capabilities and lead to more frequent disagreements. Often, those against early
enlargement stress that unanimous decisionmaking would become increasingly difficult.
It is perhaps so — but NATO learned to live with such consequences in the past. In a
strictly statistical sense, enlargement from twelve to sixteen members was more significant
than enlargement from sixteen to perhaps twenty.
A. COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE "STUDY ON NATO
ENLARGEMENT"
Hungary's bid for membership of NATO and the EU is not
driven just by security perceptions, it's a part of a
modernization policy based on shared values with Western
democracies.
- Paul Beaver123
As an applicant for NATO membership, Hungary represents a certain natural middle
ground among the other candidates. Its population, now 10.2 million, is about a fourth of
Poland's, but still more than double of Slovakia's. Its territory, 93,030 sq. kms, also ranks
middle among the extremes ofthe region. 124 Its resources are moderate, with the exception
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of a well-educated, innovative population. Although it is not contiguous with present
NATO territory, neither does it have a common border with Russia, its neighbors including
Austria to the west, Slovakia to the north, the Ukraine to the northwest, Romania to the
east, the former Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia), Croatia, and Slovenia to the south. With the
exception of neutral Ukraine and Romania, all of its neighbors are smaller than Hungary
itself.
The reforms Hungary has gone through since the system change of 1989 have not
been easy, and they are far from complete. 125 However, sufficient time has passed so that
it is now possible to evaluate some of these processes, often simply referred to as
"democratization". The above characteristics make it fairly easy to use Hungary as the
proverbial "veterinarian's horse", in an attempt to establish how far along this area might
be on its way to fulfilling membership requirements in the Alliance. It is all the more
important because these observations might prove useful in dispensing with some of the
commonly raised objections against Hungary's acceptance into NATO. In the following
pages, the four requirements established by the "Study on NATO Enlargement" will be
assessed in order to establish whether Hungary is really ready for enlargement or, whether
the sceptics are right, and the whole process should be drawn out.
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I Gyarmati, a high-ranking Hungarian official put it in similar terms, "Nach den freien Wahlen
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1. Acceptance of OSCE Norms and Principles
Hungary is widely regarded as perhaps the most compliant among the countries of
the region regarding the observance of political freedoms, international law and norms of
behavior, as demands the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
The country is now in the middle of the second term of government since the first free
elections of 1990. The U.S. Department of State's 1995 report on human rights, while
listing the fact that the government still controls most of the radio and television channels,
nevertheless comments on the independence of the written media, and establishes that
Hungary is a working parliamentary democracy. 126
A recent Freedom House publication, similarly, stresses the importance of the
changes in the Hungarian political process and civil society. When measured on a l-to-7
scale (1= totally free, 7= not free), political rights in Hungary were given a rating of 1,
civilian liberties, a 2, in 1995.
127 As Table 1 shows, there has been a consistent
improvement in both areas since the system change in 1989-1990.
126
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Table 1 . Freedom House Ratings - Hungary
Hungary's achievement ranks on the same level as the Czech Republic's {PR=1,
CL= 2, S=free} in 1995, and precedes all other countries of East Central Europe and the
former Soviet republics. Poland's rating in 1995 was {2, 2, free}, Slovakia's, {2, 3, free},
in sharp contrast with the abysmal ratings some of the Newly Independent States generated
(Kazakhstan, e.g., "achieved" a {6, 5, not free}, Azerbaijan, a {6, 6, not free}, while
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were both given the worst possible evaluation {7, 7, not
free}). In the same year, the Russian Federation was given a less-than-respectable score,
{4, 5, partly free}.
128
One of the most serious arguments against Hungarian membership has been the
problem associated with the fairly large Hungarian minorities in the surrounding countries.




a wait-and-see attitude could invite the very instabilities that membership of
NATO could alleviate. The prospect of membership has already proved an
important spur to resolving national differences, as for example in the
Hungarian-Slovak Treaty. 129
Actually, Hungary has attempted to negotiate bilateral "basic treaties" designed to
maintain good neighborly relations with most of the surrounding countries. Today, such
treaties exist with Ukraine, Slovakia, and Slovenia. With Austria, no such treaty was
negotiated since the nature of relations between the two countries did not change, and the
bilateral relationship has been cordial for a long time. Croatian ratification of such a treaty
is imminent. Romania has announced that its national interests for the present dictate that
it does not sign the treaty, although negotiations have reached an advanced phase. 130 Due
to the Yugoslav breakup, until recently no diplomatic relationship has been established
with Serbia. Undoubtedly, once a more relaxed atmosphere materializes, talks will
begin. 131
In accordance with European Union requirements, the treaties include similar
formulae regarding mutual treatment of ethnic minorities. Thus, the potential for ethnic
conflict among future members, or between future members and states bordering on them,
129
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has effectively diminished. 132 This has come about despite widely held notions regarding
the irreconcilability of interests in this area.
Two additional comments about the minority issue need be raised. First of all,
Hungary never officially voiced irredentist claims regarding the territories taken from it
in the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920. Says Charles Dick,
There is now a large, though not universal, consensus which accepts that
Trianon, as restored and modified by the Paris Treaty of 1947, is, despite its
perceived injustices, irreversible. Of course, reconciliation to existing frontiers
does not imply indifference to the fate of Hungarian minorities abroad. 133
As long as the requirements set forth by the current treaties are observed, Hungary
has no grounds for complaint, much less to initiate any conflict. 134 Even without the
protection provided by such a treaty, Hungary did not start an armed confrontation with
Serbia, although some suggested that in view of the Serbian treatment of the Hungarian
minority during the new Balkan conflict, such action would have been justifiable. Instead,
Hungary constrained itselfto purely diplomatic efforts, complying with the norms set forth
132
This comment is made regarding the Hungarian Republic. Whether the other potential members
have made similar arrangements (excepting Slovakia, since it is party to the treaty with
Hungary), is not known by the Author.
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Charles Dick, "Hungary's Security Policy", Jane's Intelligence Review 6, no. 7 (July 1994),
310.
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Incidentally, the issue has not been raised that Hungarian maltreatment of its own minorities
might result in intervention from neighboring countries. Two reasons for this come to mind:
(1) the ethnic homogeneity of Hungary and (2) the admittedly good treatment of its minorities.
See: Nations in Transit. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the
Newly Independent States , ibid, 64.
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by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. 135 Often since, Hungarian
caution has been seen as a source of unreliability. It is important to note, however, that no
NATO guarantees were given at the time, and that the country certainly could not afford
to endanger the Hungarian minority in Serbia. 136 Due to a recent decision, Hungarian
troops now participate in the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia, reflecting "Hungary's
interest in peace for Bosnia as well as a long-standing policy to support a peaceful
settlement of the conflict." 137
Conflicts are, of course, not unknown in the region. It is wise to remember, however,
that while the Warsaw Treaty Organization was said to prevent such intra-alliance
disputes, even without the Soviet Union's interference, these countries, at least the
Visegrad four, have managed to maintain a peaceful attitude in the settlement of ethnic
issues. The fact that they have steered clear from such conflicts should also signal to
NATO that such concerns may be exaggerated. This should positively influence Western
thinking — but has failed to make an impression so far.
135
As Jane's Intelligence Review establishes, "[T]he country is not merely a disinterested
spectator of the break-up of the former Yugoslvaia. Hungary is particularly concerned about
the treatment of some 300,000 ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina in northern Serbia. To date, the
leadership has been keen to avoid exacerbating tensions between Budapest and Belgrade.",
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2. Economic and Social Stability
Although the study establishes that selection of new NATO members will be granted
individually, in keeping with the above statement, it is worth stressing the potential
importance of the Visegrad countries to Europe. The four (Poland, the Czech and the
Slovak Republics, and Hungary), constitute an area roughly the same size as France, with
a population of close to 65 million (bigger than that of France, smaller than Germany's). 138
It is hard to dismiss the significance of a market this size — particularly if the expectations
regarding the future growth in the region materialize.
In the years since 1989 Hungary has gone through an extensive economic
transformation. The command economy as a whole has almost totally been dismantled, and
the foundations of a genuine market economy have been laid. Current economic
achievements include:
- the creation of the first stock exchange in Eastern Europe (in 1988);
- the privatization (often: reprivatization) of state property. Today, 80 percent
of all property is in private hands, including over 90 percent of agricultural
lands. Approximately 97 percent of housing is either private or in the hands
of municipalities. Up to 65 percent of industry, and over 70 percent of
business and services are also in private hands. The amended constitution
guarantees the inviolability of private property; 139
- the resructuring of the economy;
- introduction of Hungarian bonds and company stocks to foreign exchanges;
- associate membership in the European Union (1994);
- export-import liberalization (completed in 1995);
138
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- harmonization of laws and economic regulation with those in the EU as part
of requirements in connection with application for full membership;
- foreign investment in Hungary today is over $10 bn, highest in the entire
region, higher than investment volume in Russia
- the curbing of inflation (from approximatel 33.4 percent in 1990 to 21.2
percent in 1994) 140
1996's achievements so far have been:
- the creation of full convertibility for the Hungarian currency, the Forint
(during the spring), followed by a further decrease in the expected rate of
inflation and the decision of the Hungarian National Bank to lower its
basic interest rates;
- gaining membership in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development (in May). 141
These steps were not easy, since out of necessity they have been conducted in an
atmosphere of economic crisis. This was due to several factors. First of all, the global
economy was experiencing difficulties. Second, due to inherent systemic problems, the
economy ofHungary (and of the other CMEA members 142) was in an even deeper decline.
It was also severely affected by the Yugoslav crisis and, more particularly, by the trade
sanctions and the effective stopping of traffic on the Danube. 143 Furthermore, shortly after
140
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the system change, in a region-wide frenzy for West European approval, these states
drastically reduced trade with one another in favor ofbetter Western goods ~ an action that
proved to be a huge shock to their underdeveloped productive capabilities. Unfortunately,
attitudes within the EU have contributed to the region's (and Hungary's) difficulties. Says
Brigitte Sauerwein,
The European Union (EU) maintains restrictions on certain "sensitive" imports
(for example steel, cement and textiles) from ECE countries on the grounds of
"fair trade", a far protectionist cry from free trade. 144
The Hungarian economy today seems to be on the mend, as its membership in the
OECD proves. The national debt burden is still high (currently at $28 bn, the World Bank
study says), nevertheless in 1996 economic growth in the range oftwo percent is expected.
Of course, it is meager compensation for six years of economic decline, but, if it can be
maintained, this trend might turn the economy around. A range of co-operation agreements
with Western companies has been concluded, aiding modernization. The fact that Western
investment in the region is highest in Hungary also underlines the trust investors have in
the recovery of the country. 145 Thus, the basic requirements for a genuine, working market
economy have been laid down. While it is not as strong as its Western counterparts, it is
on its way to becoming a reliable, if not yet first-rank, economy, able to satisfy NATO's
144
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membership requirements. This transformation also signals the existence of shared values,
so important according to the "Study on NATO Enlargement."
Although the reforms laid down the foundations of the market economy, they have
been costly regarding social stability. While unemployment levels do not resemble those
in Russia, Hungarians, too, find it difficult to accept that the days of "goulash
Communism" (i.e., the "golden era") are over. Nevertheless, social problems have not
resulted in any large-scale desire to "turn back the clock". While the ruling coalition is led
by the Hungarian Socialist Party, its policies are aimed at general liberalization and at
balancing the state budget in a decidedly conservative manner.
3. Establishment of Democratic and Civilian Control over the Military
The problem of democratic control is a serious one, all the more so because there is
no single standard within the Alliance today as to what constitutes an effective civilian and
democratic control of the military. The qualifying word "democratic" is needed to
differentiate between a dictatorial-type civilian control (e.g., one person or, as in the case
of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, one party, independent of the military, decides on its
mission) and one that rests on some countrywide consensus. Says Karsten Voigt,
The expression "democratic control" is widely understood as meaning that
armed forces are clearly subordinate and accountable to democratically elected
authorities and that they do not constitute an autonomous entity capable of
exercising excessive influence over policy. 146
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95
In the case of Hungary, a number of measures have been taken since 1989 to create
an effective, democratic control over the military, although not all resulted in practical
solutions. Often, financial difficulties have undercut good intentions, at other times, the
sheer inexperience of those responsible or institutional factors have blocked progress.
During the negotiations on the system change in 1989, already the question of de-
politicizing the military came up. Today, Subsection (2) of Section (1) of the Act on
National Defence says, "The armed forces shall, in peace and war alike, be under
continuous civilian control." 147 The revised Constitution of 1989 signalled the beginnings
of a system of civilian control. It delineated the tasks of the National Assembly, the
president, the government, and the minister of defense in peacetime, in various crises, and
in war. In peace, the civilian minister of defense is responsible for the everyday running
of the military, with guidance provided by parliament (expressed in laws and
recommendations by the Natonal Defense Committee) and the chief of staff. In crises,
parliament decides about the necessary steps to be taken, with a two-thirds majority needed
to declare war or a state of emergency. In such a case, parliament, or its National Defense
Council, is to conduct a continuous session. The president, who is nominally the
commander-in-chief of the military, exercises various functions. These include the
inspection and sanctioning of laws in peace; in crisis, if the immediate assembly of
parliament for some reason is impossible, the president announces the state of emergency
147
Quote from: Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, National Defence '95 (Ministry of
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(or war) and forms the Council of Defense. 148 In such a case, the president is also
responsible for the initiation of the emergency measures otherwise assigned to parliament
The Council of Defense includes the president, the head of parliament, the section leaders
in parliament, the prime minister and the ministers, the commander of the armed forces,
and the chief of staff. 149
Together with the issue of democratic control comes the need to democratize the
military itself. Examining the situation in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe,
Dale Herspring contends that it is a two-stage process. In the first stage, those individuals
and structures most supporting the old system must be removed and the primacy of the
Communist Party eliminated. In the second stage, the transition from a non-democratic to
a democratic military must be made. Presently, these countries are in various stages of this
process. The biggest difficulty they have had to cope with is the fact that total destruction
of the old military structures, due to a lack of alternatives, would have threatened to
undermine national security. 150
The first stage was completed some time ago in Hungary. Many officers who could
not condone the changes retired. Early retirement was offered to some, others reached the
age limit, still others found occupation in the civilian sphere. Communist Party
148
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97
membership, as it had been almost compulsory previously, was not to become a dividing
line, but the present Act on National Defence does not allow professional members of the
military membership in political parties, thereby effectively providing for the neutrality
of the armed forces. The same act also laid down the foundations of religious freedom and
practice of religion within the military.
The reduction of the size of the military and the associated civilian infrastructure, as
shown in Table 2, is a result of four factors: (1) the recognition that with the end of the
Cold War, the creation of a smaller, "streamlined" military is now possible and, from the
point of the civilian economy and the state budget, desirable; (2) the change in the military
doctrine. Warsaw Pact plans foresaw extensive counterattack operations. With the
dismantling of the organization, Hungary could create a military doctrine to provide
exclusively for the Hungarian national interest. Its defensive character allowed for further
reductions in the military. (3) Technology and the new international environment require
the existence of a voluntary (professional) force rather than a conscription-based one. (4)
Financial strains necessitated strict economizing within the armed forces. Its consequences
were spontaneous and forced reductions. The former have been the result of the military's
inability to keep up with wages in the civilian sphere. Institutional reductions have
followed partly from the military doctrine, and from the series of reforms within the
military aimed at the creation of a more effective and stringent organization. This latter
aspect, however, has created additional difficulties. For example, the departure of young
and middle-aged officers has left the military with an acute problem of succession in
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leadership. The morale ofthose who remained is low, particularly because some 40 percent
of them live below the officially recognized poverty level. 151
Table 2 below also shows the significant decrease in all categories of personnel.
From 1989 to 1996, the number of officers has decreased by approximately 33 percent, that
of NCO's, 26 percent. The 60 percent decrease in conscripts' numbers has been a
consequence of three factors. First, a reduction in conscription terms (from eighteen to
twelve, and, in 1995, to ten months); (2) the introduction of the concept of "conscientious
objection" and the possibility to elect civilian instead of military service, 152 and (3) the
general reduction in the number of youth in the requisite age groups, a consequence of
demographic trends. The number of civilian employees has effectively halved (51 percent
decrease). Taking the four categories as a whole, the Hungarian military has gone through
a radical 52 percent "half-sizing".
151
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Officers NCOs Conscripts Civilian
Employees
Total
1989 17,800 12,700 91,900 33,300 155,700
1990 17,300 12,400 81,000 32,500 143,200
1991 16,800 1 1 ,900 65,300 27,600 121,600
1992 14,400 8,500 51,100 26,000 100,000
1993 13,700 8,300 52,340 25,660 100,000
1994 13,100 9,000 51,640 24,060 97,800
1995 13,308 9,603 46,350 23,900 93,155
1996
(Projected)
11,983 9,433 36,718 16,329 74,463
OOccrc




Table 2. Downsizing in the Hungarian Military, 1989-1996 153
153
Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, National Defence '95 , ibid., 13. 1996 data: "A
Honvedseg Koltsegvetesi Letszamanak Alakulasa" (Magyar Honvedseg, 1 996).
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During the debates about the democratization of the Hungarian military, the question
of the transformation from a conscription-based to a volunteer military force has emerged.
At present, this option is hampered by the financial situation of the country. Although
many say that such a force would better embody democratic values, even advocates predict
its establishment could not take place before 20 1 0-201 5. 154
To aid the better adjustment of the remaining personnel to democratic civilian
control, the system of military education has been significantly changed. The length of
education in military colleges has been extended from three years to four, with topics
revised to suit the altered circumstances and the needs of a modern, democratic military.
For the first time, females can now enter the military through the military colleges,
although their choices are less extensive (e.g., they cannot participate in combat training).
Additionally, having had many officers trained in the Soviet Union, the need to
"familiarize Hungarian officers with how a military officer functions in a democratic
society" 155 has emerged. For this reason, courses offered in Western training centers and
educational institutions are now eagerly accepted. An international Military Language
154
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Training Centre was also set up to help officers from the region learn to communicate with
other Partners and NATO members. 156
All in all, significant steps have been taken to promote the creation of a democratic,
civilian-controlled military in Hungary. 157 In the immediate future, further clarification of
tasks among the defense minister, parliament, and the president is needed. Much of this
depends on the sequencing of work on the new constitution. Many facets of democratic
civilian control, however, will require a longer period to take root ~ not only because they
involve extensive retraining within the military, but also because the population, too, has
to accept, and adjust to, these changes.
4. Acceptance of Existing NATO Policies and Doctrines, Adjustment to Military
Requirements Inside NATO
NATO needs to be careful about appearing to develop a
double standard, with different or tougher requirements for
new democracies of the East.
- James W. Morrison 158
As the "Study on NATO Enlargement" specifies, members-to-be "must be prepared
to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits, and burdens of common security and
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Some of these changes have already borne fruit. When in 1991 the Antall government
contemplated the use of the military against the so-called "taxi-drivers' blockade," a week of
civilian disobediance agamst the government's policies, the military leadership refused to
participate. Seen in this light, Gerhard Wettig's concern that "There has already been an
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collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in
the Strategic Concept and refined in subsequent Ministerial statements." 159 The most
important objectives include: "coordination of multinational force formations,
interoperability of military equipment, maintenance of effective communications among
different military forces, and overall quality of military forces." 160 These tasks require
extensive harmonization of applicants' aims and military doctrines with those ofNATO,
and are not likely to work well unless practiced. Present exercises in the Partnership for
Peace Programme and participation in various peacekeeping operations may remedy this
situation. Additionally, to be able to share the burdens arising in the Alliance, the
economic and military capabilities of the applicants must be brought closer to acceptable
NATO levels.
Eastward enlargement in itself may contribute to European security in two forms. In
a "negative" way, it could deny control over this territory to a potential aggressor. There
are, however, "positive" potentials in enlargements, e.g., the possibility of widening the
zone of stability and democracy in Europe. Even in a military sense these countries can be
more than a liability. A recent RAND analysis suggests that in terms ofNATO's declared
159
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new missions, the Visegrad four might have a significant role in future NATO missions
because the crisis potential is most acute in those areas where their expertise is greatest. 161
The analysis mentions three "comparative advantages" on the Eastern European side:
(1) a crisis in Europe or in the territory of the former Soviet Union would probably include
Slavic peoples, or at least peoples who can speak a Slavic language. The linguistic abilities
ofthese countries would, in such a scenario, significantly enhance the chances of success.
(Although Hungarians are not Slavic, many officers in the military still speak Russian.) (2)
Such a crisis (even in more distant corners of the world) would also potentially involve
militaries partially equipped with Soviet or Warsaw Pact weaponry, even whole militaries
trained by one or other WTO-member's military experts. In this case, war plans, doctrines,
even logistical problems may easier be decoded and analyzed by Eastern Europeans than
for other NATO members. (3) The reformed ground forces in the Visegrad countries
already conform to the rapid-reaction structure approved in NATO. 162
a. The Politics of Membership and Co-operation Experiences
On the policy-making level, the need to co-operate with, and achieve
membership in, NATO is widely accepted in Hungary. A referendum about NATO
membership is scheduled to take place in 1996, not because its final result could be
contrary to expectations, but largely to symbolize that there is a wide consensus on this
161
Thomas S. Szayna, Central European Defense Industries and NATO Enlargement. Issues for
U.S. Policy (RAND MR-717.0-RC. January 1996), 9-14.
162
Thomas S. Szayna, ibid., 9-14.
104
issue. The present ruling coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of
Free Democrats, who together control more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament,
wants to avoid accusations that these two parties would decide matters of national
importance between themselves, rather than bend to the popular will. Thus, when Morrison
assumes that the referendum means that "there is sufficient desire to defer NATO
membership" in Hungary, he misunderstands the domestic political agenda of the country.
In fact, president Arpad Goncz predicted that some 70-75 percent of the population would
vote for membership in the Alliance. 163
A further question in the political arena is whether Hungary, if such need arose,
would accept the stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil. The new military doctrine states
that Hungary would neither possess weapons of mass destruction, nor would it allow any
foreign power to deploy or transport such weapons on the country's territory. 164 While this
is certainly a limitation for NATO, experts in the East and in the West have stressed that
presently, this may not be the key to enlargement. Karsten Voigt stated that "the
requirement for NATO to station forces and nuclear weapons on the territory of certain
member states has lost its importance; there is no need, therefore, for NATO to deploy
such forces on the territory of new members." 165 Defense minister Gyorgy Keleti in an
163
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interview said that while the question whether Hungary would allow nuclear weapons on
its soil was still an open one, it would be easier for Russia to accept NATO enlargement
if it did not involve nuclear weapons on the territory of former Warsaw Pact members. 166
Willingness to co-operate with NATO has become much more evident in the
past year. The process took off slowly, with Hungary emerging from being merely a
signatory ofthe Helsinki Final Act of 1975, to member of the Council of Europe, associate
partner in the WEU, member of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, to gaining
associate status to the European Union, and, in 1994, to becoming a signatory to, and
participant in, the Partnership for Peace Programme. 167
The 1993 "Basic Principles of National Defense in the Republic of Hungary"
announced that the Hungarian military "shall have forces with which to engage in the
peacekeeping and peacemaking activities of the UN and other international crisis
management organizations" 168 Since the end of 1994, a fully trained company, capable of
carrying out conventional peacekeeping tasks, has been at Hungary's disposal. While in
the past, peacekeeping responsibilities accepted by Hungary mostly involved observers
only, presently, a Hungarian contingent of engineers within IFOR helps build roads and
bridges, and neutralize mines in Bosnia. Also, a further contingent of approximately 500
166
Duncan Shiels, "No NATO nukes deal could placate Russia, Hungary", Reuters World Service
,
6 May 1996 (Lexis-Nexis: NEWSATOPNWS).
167
See: James W. Morrison, ibid., Appendix B, 133. Also: Jeffrey Simon, ibid., 55.
168
National Defence '95 , ibid., 18.
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soldiers is to be sent for regular peacekeeping tasks in the near future. Within this
framework, the temporary stationing of American troops on Hungarian soil was accepted
in December 1995. NATO's IFOR also has the right to use Hungarian airports and
airspace, as well as accomplish logistics functions. In November 1996, the Hungarian
parliament ratified the "Status of Forces Agreement" with the United States of America. 169
Says Lefebvre,
Hungary's participation in implementing the Dayton agreement is one of
the country's main tests if it is to gain NATO membership. [...] Foreign
Miniszter Laszlo Kovacs declared that the decision was "a goodwill
message which shows the commitment of Hungary to co-operate with
NATO". 170
Naturally, joint operations and temporary stationing of troops on Hungarian soil
not only signal Hungary's desire to do almost anything necessary for its NATO
membership, but they also mean that the country, when deemed necessary, is willing to go
"out-of-area". Previously, some experts criticized Hungary for its lack of participation in
some Partnership for Peace exercises (especially the first one, held in Poland — although
what exactly Hungary could have contributed to a naval exercise is doubtful). Since then,
however, Hungary has participated in a number of Partnership for Peace exercises, and
even hosted several of them.
169
"Az IFOR Hadmuvelet es Magyarorszag", Hirlevel no 1, 30 January 1996, p. 1.
(Http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/newsl .htm)
170
Stephane Lefebvre, ibid., 57-58.
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On occasion, the government itself had been instrumental in bringing about
such accusations, e.g., by not allowing AWACS overflights in 1993. However, it must also
be remembered that at the time, no NATO guarantees were forthcoming, and the
leadership was quite anxious about the Hungarian minority's fate in Serbia. That these
difficulties have been overcome is signalled by the level of present Hungarian participation
in NATO's Bosnia mission. 171
b. Economic and military capabilities, equipment modernization issues
As a test of its capabilities, present Hungarian economic indicators will be
compared with some ofthe major capability indicators within NATO as they existed at the
time of previous enlargements, and also with current ones. 172 Table 3 below shows that in
this area, there is urgent need for adjustment.
In view of the further reductions that have taken place in Hungary since 1993-
1994, Hungary is facing a difficult dilemma: financially, it cannot afford to spend more on
its defense, politically, its membership aspirations necessitate to do so.
Table 3 shows that Hungary is lagging behind in the financial indicators
(although it still has more than twice the size of Turkish per capita GDP), and has an
171
See: Brigitte Sauerwein, ibid.
172
Table 3 compiled from: (1) Columns (Bl)--(E): Secretary of Defense William Perry, Toward
a New Partnership in Responsibility Sharing (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington,
DC, 1995); (2) Columns (F) -- (G): The Military Balance 1994-1995 (IISS: London, 1995),
(3) Hungarian data: Nations in Transit , ibid., 64, The Military Balance 1994-1995 , ibid.,
National Defence '95 , ibid., 13., Hungary. Structural Reforms for Sustainable Growth , ibid.
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average achievement regarding personnel-related indicators. The latter, however, might
be misleading because, since 1993, further downsizing reduced personnel levels even
more, thereby lessening capabilities.
On a different level, it is possible to see the Hungarian economic and military
potential in a more favorable light. When compared to indicators taken from the period
shortly after the first phase of previous enlargements had finished in 1955, the gap does
not seem quite so threatening. While underachievement is usually explained by the relative
unequality in burden-sharing between the USA and the other members, Tables 4 and 5
might show that there is no simple figure to describe potential.
As the tables indicate, it is difficult to establish any comparison. Members have
diverged on occasion so much that even a general trend cannot be described. It is even
more difficult to estimate the cost-benefit ratio individual members enjoy. While Table 5
shows an earlier stage in the life of the Alliance, surely, its data may still be relevant today.
A sign of this controversy is that, since 1986, NATO has been applying the formula,
"shared roles, risks, and responsibilities" when measuring members' contributions. As
Table 5 demonstrates, the distribution of benefits from the Alliance has been just as
























































































































































































































































































































































































Member I960 1975 1993
GNP D/GNP GNP D/GNP GDP D/GDP
USA 1 1 1 3 1 2
FRG 2 7 2 6 2 11
UK 3 3 4 4 5 4
France 4 2 3 5 3 5
Italy 5 10 5 12 4 9
Canada 6 6 6 13 6 12
Netherlands 7 9 7 8 8 8
Belgium 8 11 8 10 9 13
Turkey 9 5 10 7 10 3
Denmark 10 13 9 11 11 10
Norway 11 12 11 9 12 6
Greece 12 4 12 2 14 1
Portugal 13 8 13 1 13 7
Luxembourg 14 14 14 14 15 15
Spain - - - - 7 14
Table 4. ] banking of NATO-menibers accorcling to GNP (GDP) and D/GNP
(D/GDP) in 1960, 1975, and 1993 173
The Federal Republic and Italy have consistently underachieved during the
decades, yet in other respects they are said to have been shouldering their fair shares. On
the other end of the spectrum, Greece and Turkey's overextension in D/GDP has started
with the conflict over Cyprus (which undoubtedly contributes to their poor showing in
173
* GNPs were converted to USD at current exchange rates, but at constant 1 963 prices (except for
Canada, Turkey and Spain, where constant 1 961 , 1 968 and 1 958 prices were used, respectively);
** Spain joined the alliance only later, therefore data about Spanish GNP and D/GNP are not
presented in the first two instances; Iceland, on the other hand, has relied on the USA for her
defence and that is why it is not included in the table. See: Gavin Kennedy, "An Economic
Theory of Alliances: A Note", Discussion Paper 1978/2 (University of Strathclyde: Glasgow), 12-
3 and Toward a New Partnership in Responsibility Sharing , ibid. Data from 1 993 are based on
Table 3.
Ill
terms of GDP and per capita GDP, as seen in Table 3). Meanwhile, Norway has
significantly improved its score, whereas Canada moved from the middle ranks to the rear
guard in terms ofD/GDP. 173
Country Defense
Expenditure
Population GNP Border Length* Average Share**
1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970
Belgium 0.64 0.72 1.92 1.81 1.40 1.50 0.14 0.14 1.15 1.15
Canada 2.64 1.95 3.76 4.01 4.39 4.81 20.02 20.02 9.39 9.61
Denmark 0.33 0.35 0.96 0.93 0.86 0.90 2.23 2.23 1.35 1.35
France 6.34 5.67 9.59 9.55 7.18 8.22 4.44 4.44 7.07 7.40
FRG 5.38 5.92 11.64 11.41 10.29 10.94 2.75 2.75 8.23 8.37
Greece 0.26 0.45 1.75 1.65 0.42 0.58 5.84 5.84 2.67 2.69
Italy 2.06 2.40 10.54 10.10 4.75 5.36 9.09 9.09 8.13 8.18
Luxembourg 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04
Netherlands 0.88 1.06 2.41 2.45 1.67 1.84 0.92 0.92 1.67 1.74
Norway 0.28 0.37 0.75 0.73 0.61 0.65 5.67 5.67 2.34 2.35
Portugal 0.20 0.42 1.86 1.64 0.30 0.36 1.50 1.50 1.22 1.17
Turkey 0.49 0.55 5.78 6.65 0.65 0.75 10.72 10.72 5.72 6.04
United Kingdom 7.25 5.60 11.04 10.45 8.15 7.05 9.27 9.27 9.49 8.92
USA 73.24 74.52 37.93 38.55 59.26 56.98 27.42 27.42 41.54 40.98
NATO Europe 24.12 23.53 58.31 57.44 36.35 38.21 52.56 52.56 49.07 49.40
North America 75.88 76.47 41.69 42.56 63.65 61.79 47.44 47.44 50.93 50.60
* Border length with "hostile" countries
** Average share from the benefits provided in the Alliance
Table 5. Relative Defense Burdens and Benefits in NATO in 1960 and 1970, % 174
173
174
See: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense , A Report to the Umted States
Congress by the Secretary of Defense (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.,
1994), Section II.
Todd Sandler and John F. Forbes, "Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO",
Occasional Paper 1979/2 (University of Aberdeen, Dept. of Political Economy, 1979), 20-23.
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Thus, the requirement that the new applicants should not become a burden to
NATO due to their weakness in financial or military capabilities is somewhat inconsistent
with Alliance practices. Furthermore, the West should recognize the difficulty in fulfilling
both requirement #2 and #4 at the same time: to enhance defense spending at the moment
would not only further endanger economic stability and potential growth, but it could lead
to a scenario the Alliance wishes to avoid: (1) it might buttress the perception of a regional
arms race, thereby destabilizing the region, 175 and (2) it could contribute to a Russian
misinterpretation of the situation.
Equipment issues in Hungary are likewise controversial. Standardization and
interoperability are key concerns within NATO ~ not surprisingly, they are given an added
importance in the case of applicants. A level of standardization and interoperability that
does not exist as yet is needed to effectively co-operate with Allies and contribute to the
common defense. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the problem, due largely to the
financial situation of the applicants.
In the Hungarian military, two contradictory, but not illogical, processes have
evolved during the past few years. First, recent weapons and equipment acquisitions have
mainly come from former WTO arsenals. The reasons for this are manifold. In the case of
the MIG-29 squadron (28 planes plus spare parts), it was the only satisfactory way Russia
could clear its one billion-dollar debt toward Hungary. 176 With German unification,
175
Duncan Shiels, "No NATO nukes deal could placate Russia, Hungary", ibid.
176
Charles Hebbert, ibid., also Brigitte Sauerwein, ibid., 441.
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Hungary could acquire fairly modern East German equipment free of cost (other than that
of shipping). This helped to avoid further cannibalization of equipment within the
Hungarian military, and also allowed for some upgrading, since the East German military
was generally better equipped than was the Hungarian. A similar deal has recently been
made with Belorus, in which case T-72 tanks, of which Belorus exceeds CFE limitations,
are being brought into Hungary at five percent of their original price. The issue has been
debated in parliament, but since the replacement of old and battered T-55 tanks is badly
needed, there was ample evidence that the purchase would improve the military's
capabilities. NATO did not raise any objections. 177 Additionally, the CFE Treaty limits
inadvertently contributed to the modernization of the military by calling for the elimination
of some of the most dated tanks. 178
Second, attempts are being made to acquire some Western polish as well. Plans
to comply with this requirement in NATO have not been entirely abandoned. Parliament
has given its approval to obtain price quotes from various foreign companies for thirty
NATO-compatible fighter planes to replace the aging MIG-21s. 179 The options are many,
since the billion-dollar deal has attracted the Lockheed, Saab, Dassault, and McDonnell
Douglas/Northrop companies. The deal will be offered not necessarily to the cheapest
177
(No byline) "Defence minister explains Russian tank deal, air force modernization", BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts from Magyar Hirlap , 7 May 1996, p. 10. (Lexis-Nexis:
NEWSATOPNWS).
178
See. Brigitte Sauerwein, "Focus on East-Central Europe", ibid., 43.
179
Ben Sullivan, "Defense Ministry looks into U.S. fighters", Budapest Business Journal , 12
February 1996, p. 16.
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supplier, since what Hungary needs most is a lengthy payment schedule and the possibility
of an offset agreement with the supplier or its country. 180 Other modernization attempts
would involve financial resources not as yet available, although the United States has
signalled its willingness to provide some financial assistance to the program.
B. CONCLUSION
[T]here will not always be smooth interaction between
current NATO forces and those of newer members whose
quality varies greatly at this point. After all, NATO's Cold
War defense structure was developed over many years.
- W. Bruce Weinrod 181
Various estimates of the costs of NATO expansion today exist. They range from
between 10 to 50 or 20 to 50 billion dollars, to a maximum of between 60,6 to 124,7
billions.
182 Not all of the expenses would be borne by the applicants, but even in the lower
range, significant contributions must be made. All depends on how soon NATO's
requirements for equitable burden-sharing and fair contributions will be implemented, and
180
Duncan Shiels, "Hungary's Fighter Deal Almost Cleared for Take-off', Reuter Business Report ,
12 May 1996 (Lexis-Nexis: NEWSH'OPNWS). Says Shiels, " Paul Beaver, analyst for Jane's
Defence Weekly, discounts the F-18, which at $40 million per plane, is twice the price of an F16
or Gripen. 'It's too expensive and too capable,' he said. The Hungarians don't need a strike
fighter. In fact, it would breach their law which stipulates that it should operate defensively" ."
181
W. Bruce Weinrod, ibid., 4.
182
The first estimate is given by Richard L. Kugler. See: Richard L. Kugler, "Defense Program
Requirements", in Jeffrey Simon, ed., ibid. The second estimate is that of Weinrod, in Bruce
B. Weinrod, ibid., the third, that of the American Congress, see: "Az euro-atlanti integracio egy
honapja (1996 aprilis)", Hirlevel no. 16 (10 May 1996), 2. (http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/
newsl6.htm.)
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on the question of what the new members would be asked to contribute to the Alliance
initially.
183 Kugler lists various options available to NATO as follows:
If the Alliance's goal is merely to configure ECE forces to defend themselves
with NATO help only in the areas of C3I and logistics support, then the cost
will be relatively low. If the alliance decides to supplement this commitment
with sizable NATO combat forces through a purely power-projection strategy
from Western Europe, the cost will rise. The cost will grow further if steps are
taken to develop a military infrastructure in East Central Europe so that NATO
combat forces can deploy there quickly. 184
Meanwhile, co-operation in other fronts continues. The government has allocated
some Ft 3 1 million from the central budget to cover the costs of supplying the Hungarian
IFOR contingent, 185 although more will be needed now that Hungary is sending another 500
troops into the region. The stationing of American troops on Hungarian soil has proven to
be a good deal more effective in strengthening communication and understanding between
NATO (and especially the American military) and Hungary than was expected. Says
Michael Roddy,
Hungarians and Americans agree the .
.
. cohabitation between a former east-
bloc communist country and the world's only remaining superpower has
been a success ~ because this time the foreign troops were invited.
[Logistics commander of the American forces Major General Wright said]
"All of the land lines of communication, the roads, the railroads lead us to
183
Karsten Voigt, ibid. Voigt also quotes the "Study on NATO Enlargement" as follows: "[N]ew
members will be expected to take part in the full spectrum of Alliance missions to the extent
appropriate to their capabilities." This he sees as a welcome sign of a realistic approach within
the Alliance.
184
Richard L. Kugler, ibid., 191-192.
185
Ben Sullivan, "Hungary chips in for Bosnia Peace Plan", Budapest Business Journal , 15
January 1996, p. 32.
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this place... So the strategic value of Hungary [...] was absolutely essential
for our success."
186
As Chapter Four has shown, much more work than this has been done in Hungary
to create a military that could satisfy the altered demands of the country. In all but the last
requirement of the "Study on NATO Enlargement", Hungary has already proven itself an
ample candidate for membership, more so than was the case with previous enlargements.
Even on the fourth count, Hungary has launched a program of modernization which,
while not assuring compatibility at the moment, will result in a more capable force, a force
that, while not in the same rank as the more advanced NATO members', might still be
convincingly compared to second-tier Allies'. As Szayna believes,
The central European militaries come out even better than the Spanish and the
Portuguese in a comparison of the quality of CFE-limited major weapons
systems. Moreover, the central Europeans actually have the equipment,
whereas the Iberians often do not. 187
In view ofthese arguments, perhaps it is time for the Alliance to announce additional
requirements, if there are any. Hungary is obviously better prepared to deal with the
problems of membership in NATO than were the previous four candidates, adequately
fulfills three of the four criteria, and has been adamantly trying to cope with the fourth.
186
Michael Roddy, "U.S. base in Hungary blazing post-Cold War trail", Reuters World Service
(1 1 May, 1996), 2. (Lexis-Nexis: NEWS/TOPNWS).
187
Thomas S. Szayna, ibid., 17.
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V. TO BE OR NATO BE: ENLARGEMENT REVISITED
What NATO is doing in 1 995 is thus part of a common
understanding among the 16 Allies upon which they are
already actmg: an awareness that the continued, collective
security of the North Atlantic Treaty nations also depends
vitally on their helping to provide security for countries in
a region stretching eastward beyond the old Cold War
confrontation line.
- NATO Review 188
at is striking how much our world has changed since 1989. Then, with the
Warsaw Treaty Organization still operational, NATO's eastward enlargement
was unimaginable. After the final dismantling of the WTO, however, early demands to
create an alternative security arrangement for Eastern Europe were voiced. These demands
were partially prompted by such optimistic NATO documents as the Rome and London
Declarations. 189 In the beginning, the Central and Eastern European states knew little
beyond the desire to join the Alliance. Requirements were often swept aside by the
observation that the West "owed it" to them, after having allowed the Soviet Union control
over the region for 45 years. 190 Often, Central European politicians argued that had it not
been for their pressure to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty Organization, or other such services,
the Cold War might still be fought. As G. Wettig observes, "This argument basically
188
"Enlargement: Part of a strategy for projecting stability into Central Europe", NATO Review
,
May 1995, p. 3.
189
NATO Transformed: The London Declaration & The Alliance's New Strategic Concept.
NATO Press Communique S- 1 (9 1 )85 . ibid.
190
Gerhard Wettig, "Post-Soviet Central Europe in International Security", European Security 3,
no. 3 (Autumn 1994), 476-7.
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implied NATO's obligation to do whatever might be necessary for the protection of
Central European countries." 191
Since 1993, when the question was raised in earnest, many Western experts have
sought to prove that NATO enlargement is dangerous, that it could only worsen the
precarious situation in the Eastern part of the continent. Among them, Howard E. Fast
opined that
The term "security vacuum" implies that, with Soviet forces gone from East
Europe, something essential to the region's security has been removed and
another powerful force will rush in to fill the space. One could begin to
question the metaphor by challenging its pre-vacuum stage: Do the leaders of
these states feel that their countries' security interests were "filled" [...] by the
Warsaw Pact? Presumably not. [...] But [security] problems do not create a
security vacuum.
Using his method of argument, however, one cannot help but wonder if a security
vacuum, nevertheless, consists of security problems. Clearly, NATO must have felt so,
thus, in September 1995 the "Study on NATO Enlargement" was created. To what extent
present applicants are able to satisfy the criteria drawn up in the document is, of course,
open to debate.
An early and insightful argument for these countries' usefulness was made by
Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee in 1993. They said that since the Visegrad four are pro-
American, their membership would enhance the Atlanticist orientation of the Alliance.
191
Gerhard Wettig, ibid., 473.
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Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security", Orbis 37, no. 1 (Winter 1993), 37-38.
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Ultimately, instead of loosening the ties between Europe and the United States, the authors
stressed, the enlargement could work for reaffirming commitment to NATO. Meanwhile,
"NATO should create the preconditions for the eventual integration of these countries into
the alliance by expanding defense cooperation". 193
There is something peculiar about the fact that there are still those who oppose
enlargement per se. The influential Josef Joffe, for example, started his own field in
political science by applying business concepts to his work. He says,
NATO finds itself in a position of a firm that, having been an exemplar of
excellence for decades, suddenly faces a severe downward shift of the demand
curve for its traditional wares. [...] Faced with an ailing cash cow, what does
such a company do? 194
According to business theory, such a company may take one of the following four
paths: 1) it may sell its remaining assets and close down shop altogether; 2) it may decide
to downsize and accept the decline in demand; 3) it may decide to develop new products;
4) it may try to conquer new markets. Joffe suggests that while NATO has been valiantly
trying to promote options #3 and #4, it has not been successful in either. He suggests that
more attention should instead be given to option #2, downsizing. The problem with this
attitude, however, is that downsizing is not a solution ~ it is a temporary asylum for
companies that cannot keep up with the market. Downsizing, if not followed by
193
Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO",
Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), 35-36.
194
Josef Joffe, "Is There Life After Victory? What NATO Can and Cannot Do", The National
Interest no. 4 1 (Fall 1 995), 20.
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rejuvenation, usually only lengthens the suffering of the company, and leads to the same
ultimate result: shutdown. However, Joffe does not suggest the dismantling ofNATO.
Joffe says that neither of the two positive options has been successful. But is that so?
The concept of "new product" within NATO might well be the promotion and
enhancement of regional stability, something NATO has been involved with ever since it
decided to take matters in Bosnia in hand (even longer if the first post-Cold War
declarations are counted). The cooperation with former WTO-members, resulting from the
Partnership for Peace program, also signals that NATO has become more flexible, more
ready to take on new missions.
The "out-of-area" issue seems to have led NATO to the idea of new markets. These
new markets include the Central and East European countries — who, for that matter, seem
not to be too eager to turn to Russia, nor create NATO's competition, which should at least
signal Joffe that while NATO may not at present be the perfect solution, the alternatives
are considered no better. Another source of demand is the United Nations. The
organization has relied on NATO troops in a variety of situations.
It is strange that while Joffe supposedly wants to help the Alliance to adjust to the
new situation, when it comes to real life, he derisively dismisses such "business". He says,
"by acting as 'subcontractor' to the UN, NATO has imposed on itself an absurd chain of




Difficulties of the complex and untried cooperation aside, what company in its right mind
would want to alienate its potential customers?
A way to avoid alienating Russia while not allowing it to dictate the rules of the
game is to stress, as Voigt has done, that "enlargement is stability-driven rather than threat-
driven". Central and Eastern European countries seek membership in the Alliance for fear
of general instability and because of the psychological reassurances such an arrangement
might provide to a region that has long been the victim of contending great power
interests.
196
At any rate, for thirty-six years the Federal Republic of Germany, as a member of the
Alliance, had a common border with two Warsaw Pact countries — the German Democratic
Republic and Czechoslovakia. While this unfortunate situation greatly disturbed NATO,
including the Federal Republic into the Alliance was still seen as the better alternative.
Today, when the threat is supposed to be diffused and smaller, to argue against
enlargement on the ground ofthe need to avoid new dividing lines on the continent sounds
both simplistic and illogical. Would Central European states in such cirmcumstances have
an interest in promoting such an image? 197 Would they deliberately try to provoke Russia?
Or is it possible that, as Germany did with its Ostpolitik and detente, these countries could
actually contribute to the region's stability? I believe the latter is true.
196
Karsten Voigt, ibid., 16.
197
Wojciech Gebicki and Anna Marta Gebicka, "Central Europe: A Shift to the Left?", Survival
37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), 134.
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The West, in any case, should avoid the trap of giving too little, too late. Its interests
in the short term might not coincide with fast NATO expansion, but as the thesis has
shown, from a long-term perspective, sooner may well be better. Otherwise, as Max
Jakobson asserts, "A cynic reading the fine print might conclude that NATO membership
will be available to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe when they no longer need
it" 198 That outcome might very well signal the end of the Alliance as we know it today.
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